Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Far East, Volume VI

894.628/7–547: Telegram

The Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State

secret
us urgent

Tokyo, July 5, 1947—8 p.m.

183. Cite C 58820. Reference War 81470¹⁶ received 5 July subject Antarctic whaling.

1. Difficulty encountered by State Department this matter thoroughly appreciated here. Our concern has now gone beyond questions, important and compelling as they are, of food deficit and burden on American tax-payer. Australian distorted pronouncements and unwarranted criticisms have been so violent and so widely publicized in the Far East that, US decisions having been made and announced, question has resolved itself into one of upholding prestige of US in Japan and throughout Far East.

2. Our detailed views as follows: With reference penultimate substantive paragraph urtel we do not perceive that Australian proposal has any merit as indicated in our memorandum 19 June to Australian Mission quoted in our 163, 19 June to Department in part as follows:

“On the basis of expert opinion it appears that the proposal is technically impracticable. It is assumed that it is the Australian concept that under the proposal Japanese whaling crews would man the vessels in question as the accommodations on the vessels are unsuitable to any but Japanese whalers accustomed to them. In such case, the principal difference in the conduct of the expedition would be that it would be under Australian control rather than under Allied control as was the first Japanese whaling expedition to the Antarctic. This Headquarters can perceive no advantage to the operation of a Japanese manned and equipped expedition under Australian control rather than under SCAP control. On the contrary, it is believed that any such arrangement would violate the underlying principle of the occupation that it shall have the character of an Allied operation under the executive authority of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Furthermore, to attain the maximum results for a 1947 expedition, active preparations therefor should have been initiated by May 15.

“The delay which would be involved in seeking Allied agreement to turn over Japanese whaling vessels to the Australian Government and in organizing any such expedition would obviate any possibility of obtaining from the forthcoming whaling season the needed food to assist the United States in supplying the deficit in this country. If in consequence of such agreement it were desired to use non-Japanese crews, the making of necessary alterations in the vessels would itself preclude any expedition during the forthcoming season.”

Australian statements that ships to be manned by Australians “and operated more efficiently than by Japanese,” and the “supplies at least as adequate as those which would be obtained from proposed Japanese expedition” are based on unjustified assumptions and do not conform to experience and results which might reasonably be expected from Australian crews and officers entirely lacking in whaling experience.

3. As regards final paragraph urtel it is our opinion that if Australia were willing to approve any SCAP-sponsored expedition, their complaints in regard to security and other aspects against full scale expedition would be completely vitiated. Technical reasons cited above (a) would make it impracticable to turn over remainder of equipment to Australians to operate in forthcoming season, (b) would mean giving Australians preference over other Allies which are presenting claims for Jap factory ships and auxiliaries and (c) would violate accepted principle of allocation of Japanese commercial shipping as matter for peace settlement. SCAP is without authority to allocate to any country Jap commercial vessels and ultimate fate of Jap whaling vessels will depend in first instance on Allied determination at Peace Conference of future of Jap whaling.

4. Australian contention that Australian people are up in arms is not accepted here. Not only have some Australian papers stated editorially that project is sound but local Australian officials other than MacMahon Ball have privately characterized Australian politicians’ sound and fury as tempest in teapot. It is the opinion here of those closely familiar with Australian political scene, that Australian protests flow from policy of endeavoring by loud assertion to bring Australia to place of effective predominance in the Far East. This in turn stems from internal Australian politics and political maneuvers of Australian officials who have made so much ill-considered public clamor in this matter. In the eyes of the Japanese people and other peoples in the Far East the carrying through of the second expedition has been blown up by the Australians into a matter of the prestige of the US and of SCAP; that is, having made a decision that is entirely just, humanitarian and practical, whether US and SCAP can or cannot be overridden by the unreasonable demands of officials of a small nation which desires Jap whaling vessels for own venal commercial interests. (It will be recalled that Australian Minister in China went so far as to issue statement to the Chinese people in the matter.)

5. Question of security interlaced with references to past Jap treachery et cetera which the Australians seem to have adopted as emotional foundation of their complaints is one which does not actually exist. It was correctly stated in this Headquarters press release 22 June: “As SCAP-controlled Japanese-manned ships operating to repatriate 5½ million Japanese prisoners of war and civilians have during the past 18 months entered numerous Allied ports in the west and southwest Pacific without incident, it is believed that no problem of security is involved in this second whaling expedition.” Sydney was one of such ports. Furthermore, while the Antarctic Ocean is not an Australian lake, appeasement of the Australians in this particular matter will undoubtedly support them in making factual their implied contention that freedom of the seas and use by others, of those international waters is subject to Australian approval.

6. Instructions to the Japanese Government in the matter have already been given and active preparations for the expedition have begun. The Jap Government and newly elected Diet have tendered formal expressions of gratitude for assistance to their problems which has been provided by the authorization. Due to its importance in the food deficit, authorization of the expedition has been featured most prominently by Japanese press and has provided very desirable and needed boost to Japanese morale to help carry them through the critical food situation. Reversal would have exceedingly unfortunate repercussions.

7. There seems to us to be involved also a simple question of right and wrong. This is the question whether we should uphold a decision that is based entirely on considerations of right. I have in mind not only the merits of the matter, which have been previously discussed, but also the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration, notably:

“(11) Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the execution of just reparations in kind, but not those which would enable her to re-arm for war. To this end, access to, as distinguished from control of, raw materials shall be permitted. Eventual Japanese participation in world trade relations shall be permitted.”

This principle was recently reaffirmed by Far Eastern Commission in its basic post-surrender policy for Japan:

“1.2.d. Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind, but not those which would enable her to rearm for war. To this end access to, as distinguished from control of, raw materials should be permitted. Eventual Japanese participation in world trade relations will be permitted.”

The foregoing also follows the fourth basic principle laid down in: the Atlantic Charter as follows:

“They will endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all states, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity.”

This principle is also one of those incorporated in the Declaration by the United Nations.

8. Any compromise of these principles or any appeasement of the Australians will without question seriously undermine American prestige in this part of the world. Appeasement will have most adverse effects on the occupation which has been so successfully carried forward by the prestige of the United States. Moreover, such appeasement would prejudice our position at the Peace conference not only because it would crown Australia’s unfair methods with success and encourage them to further utilization of such methods but would also point way to the Japs to seek selfish ends through the medium of loud complaint.

Atcheson

16. Not found in Department files.