Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, General; The United Nations, Volume I

Department of State Disarmament Files

Memorandum Submitted by the War Department Member to the Executive Committee on Regulation of Armaments ¹

top secret
RAC D–19/a

[Washington,] July 30, 1947.

[Draft] Memorandum for the Secretaries of State, War and the Navy

Subject: United States Position If Effective International Control of Atomic Energy Cannot Be Accomplished.

1. On 12 March 1947, the Executive Committee on the Regulation of Armaments undertook on its own initiative to study the alternate courses the United States might pursue if, as appeared likely, Soviet opposition were to prevent agreement on an effective system of international control of atomic energy. On 17 March 1947, the Assistant Secretary of War conveyed to the Committee the War Department’s view “that it should proceed, as a matter of priority, to study this matter and submit as soon as possible its recommendations covering United States policy and procedure in the eventuality envisaged.”

2. The Committee is convinced that the Soviet opposition to the “Baruch” plan derives not merely from specific disagreement with the plan itself but rather is one single facet of the overall Soviet policy of opposition to the principles and aims of the Western democracies. It does not appear either logical or possible to isolate the case of atomic energy from the other facets, such as Soviet resistance to European economic unity, to a Four-Power Pact against resurgence of German militarism, or a single cooperative effort toward European rehabilitation.

3. It becomes apparent that Soviet obduracy is destroying the hoped for degree of agreement among the great powers essential to a unified undertaking of their direct responsibilities and to the effectiveness of the United Nations. The effect is to postpone the probability of a truly comprehensive system of international cooperation and collective security toward which objective the United Nations constitutes, admittedly, only a first step.

4. Therefore, the Committee concludes that the question requiring immediate solution is not: What position the United States should take if and when international agreement on control of atomic energy appears hopeless, but rather: What is to be the United States policy in the face of the “two-world” situation which Soviet intransigeance is clearly creating?

5. The greatly extended scope which the problem thus assumes appears to the Committee tantamount to the formulation of basic United States foreign policy, and thus far beyond its competency. On the other hand, the Committee is not unaware of recent developments and current planning which indicate an orientation of overall United States policy sufficiently discernible for the Committee to organize its thinking along parallel lines. It is in this light that the attached study has been developed.

6. The Executive Committee recommends the attached study to the Secretaries of State, War and the Navy as suggesting an essential application of present United States foreign policy. The Committee requests expressions of opinion on the whole or parts of the attached in order to provide general guidance for its further work toward concrete recommendations.

[Annex]

Applying the Truman Doctrine to the United Nations

1. The fundamental aim of the United States is the attainment of lasting world-wide peace and security. We believe that the following principles are essential to that attainment:

a. Government subordinate to the freely expressed wish of the governed based on respect for the equal rights of all.

b. International relationship in conformity with principles of justice and law, recognizing the collective responsibility for the enforcement of peace and security.

2. Only universal acceptance of an authority superior to the State can guarantee the ultimate accomplishment of this aim. Such acceptance being unobtainable at this time, the United Nations was designed to offer a means for the voluntary cooperation of States toward that same end. Its establishment presupposes, and its effectiveness depends on, the sincerity of all its members in their cooperative endeavor.

3. The principles and aims of the United Nations are substantially identical to the principles and aims of the United States. Therefore,

a. the United States is best pursuing its own aims by wholeheartedly supporting the United Nations, and

b. policies or actions inconsistent with the aims and principles of the United Nations are inimical to the fundamental aims and principles of the United States.

4. The record of international activities, within and without the United Nations, indicates that pursuit of these aims has been seriously impeded by constant opposition from the Soviets. Their opposition is so widespread and so consistent as to justify the conclusion that the Soviets are fundamentally insincere in their professed adhesion to the aims and principles of the United Nations which their membership implies.

5. In view of this Soviet insincerity, it does not appear likely that unanimity can be reached at this time on any of those factors on which only complete agreement among the great powers can presage effective cooperation toward worldwide peace and security. This essential unanimity is unattainable so long as one of the major powers continues to seek subordinate aims which conflict with the basic principles of the United Nations and with the majority of its members’ concept of international democracy.

6. Ultimately a “single world” must eventuate—either their way or our way must prevail or a satisfactory compromise be achieved—for it is inconceivable that the narrowing world can interminably endure two such widely opposed concepts. Admitting the possibility that force may become the sole final arbiter of which “credo” is to survive, this calamitous method of decision is not today the only course, nor the one which either side could advantageously adopt. The less drastic alternative is to temporize without appeasement: to prolong the time during which a “divided world” can endure in peace giving fullest opportunity for the areas of present and future common self-interest to emerge while the areas of present and past conflict and distrust are fading into unimportance.

7. This alternative will probably never be adopted through formalized understanding between the opposing factions; rather can it be said to be already in effect as a consequence of the fact that neither side would today, or in the immediate future, resort to war unless inescapably forced into it. This period of peaceful endurance can end in only one of two ways: (1) by war between the Soviets and ourselves or, (2) by the gradual transition of the “divided world” into the eventual “one world” through reconciliation of conflicting principles into a single cooperative aim.

8. Assuming our intent to keep the door always open for ultimate international cooperation, it remains to determine how best we can pursue the accomplishment of our basic aims during the endurance of this divided world. Since we surely do not wish to destroy the hard won beginnings of unity which the United Nations represents, we must contrive a means of operating a “two world” system within the broad limits of a “one world” framework. This entails strengthening the United Nations to the maximum extent possible and, in those matters dealt with of necessity outside the organization, acting in conformity with its aims and principles, but it further entails active resistance, wherever applicable, to the development or extension of policies which are basically hostile to those aims.

9. It will be argued that active resistance to Soviet aims might weaken rather than strengthen the United Nations by inviting the possibility of Soviet withdrawal or, at best, aggravating the dead-lock. On the other hand, it is a well recognized method of communist expansion to insinuate into an organization in apparent sympathy with its purposes only, under this so-called United Front, to divert it to Soviet ends, either by eventual domination or by undermining it from within. Therefore, against this first risk is posed a second, and conceivably greater one: that by non-resistance we may be aiding the transformation of the United Nations into a “United Front.”

10. The Truman Doctrine evidences the application of this “resistance” concept to our direct relationships outside of the United Nations but has not as yet been extended to our participation within the United Nations where we continue patiently to watch the Soviets thwart the will of the majority by distortion, specious argument, the introduction of impracticable counterproposals, and capricious abuse of the veto, thereby frustrating all effective action.

11. It is unnecessary to set forth here the long record of unremitting Soviet opposition. Only detailed study of every verbatim report of every organ and sub-agency gives the full picture of their undeviating singleness of purpose. The fact of frustration becomes undeniable and the pattern of cause and effect permits of no reasonable explanation except that the Soviets are deliberately prostituting the United Nations. Under the circumstances, for the United States not to make a firm stand against its further subversion, would be to acquiesce in the wilful enfeeblement of our prestige and that of the organization on which we base our fondest hope of lasting world peace and security; veritably, would we be “fiddling while Rome burned.”

12. It is submitted that the United States must directly and forth-rightly impugn the Soviets’ present attitude toward the United Nations as violating the purposes and principles of the Charter, and, concurrent therewith, make a thorough and explicit pronouncement of the policies in respect of every phase of United Nations activities which we, under the circumstances, intend to pursue. No lesser action on our part would accomplish what must be done to preserve the organization.

13. As mentioned above, the immediate argument against such a suggestion would probably be that it might invite—or even force—the Soviets to withdraw in “injured innocence” from membership. It is, therefore essential to examine the actual likelihood of their doing so as well as the foreseeable results, if they did. Let it first be admitted that the likelihood will largely depend on the terms in which our indictment and intentions are expressed. It is here assumed that they would be painstakingly phrased to avoid belligerency, castigation and any semblance of recrimination, but would rather constitute the regretful citation of a record which impelled up to certain conclusions leading, in turn, to a calm reaffirmation of our adherence to the principles and aims of the Charter and our firm intention that they be extended to all peoples.

a. On this assumption, it is believed unlikely that the Soviets would withdraw. In the first place it would presumably catch them off-balance and in the spotlight of public attention, a situation in which the vagaries of the oriental type of reasoning processes are peculiarly handicapped because they do not permit impetuous reaction—the Russian does not “think well on his feet.” In the second place, for them to withdraw, in the face of such a measured indictment, from an organization wherein they have always shown exaggerated ideas of their especial importance would be an admission of defeat—if not of guilt—unacceptable to the Slavic mind. Thirdly, the Soviets would, it is believed, find ways to absorb any amount of mere oral criticism rather than deny themselves the forum and the prestige the United Nations provides. Fourthly, it is doubted that the Soviets are in any condition to cut themselves loose from the material benefits the Western world can furnish to their grave problems of rehabilitation. Lastly, the United States did not contemplate withdrawal at any of the many occasions when our motives or sincerity were pilloried in Soviet statements; to the Soviets strong invective against one’s opponent is an accepted technique of debate—so, they are not likely to retreat before even strong criticism.

b. Next, assuming they did withdraw, what would the results be? Even admitting that such a step would apparently lessen the United Nations’ immediate potential for complete international cooperation, it would do so to no greater extent than the Soviets’ present obstructionism. Moreover, it is an open question whether a United Nations minus Soviet and Satellites but effective in the limited collective security and mutual cooperation of its remaining members, would not be a more constructive vehicle for the pursuit of peace than is the present organization under circumstances as they are. Whether the Soviets are inside or outside the United Nations would not appear to have serious bearing on which way the “divided world” period will end. The all-important factor is that the door to ultimate cooperation be kept always wide open for the eventual dissolution of the “two worlds” into the hoped-for “one.”

c. Should they not withdraw, the results to the United Nations could not be other than a marked improvement over present conditions and might represent a spectacular turning point in history. For it is completely compatible with previous experience that the Russians will proceed along a chosen course only as far as can be done without encountering clear opposition and it is, thus, not impossible that a firm stand on our part might be the dominant factor in a reversal of Soviet attitude. Should this happen, an immeasurable advance would have been accomplished toward the ultimate goal of real international cooperation.

14. It is, therefore, contended that it is better for the United States to take the calculated risk of possible Soviet withdrawal than to permit the unchallenged continuance of Soviet subversion of the United Nations. At the same time it is recognized that the manner in which this risk is taken is no less important than the decision on the risk itself. The situation is extremely delicate and how anything is done may well be as important as what is done. The decision once made, it will become imperative to plan the actual exposition of the United States position and the projection of that position into every phase of our activities in the United Nations with the utmost care. Also, what we do or plan to do within the United Nations should be supported by an equally carefully conducted campaign of education so that the American people and the informed public opinion of the world may have full and accurate knowledge of our course of action and the why’s and wherefore’s of its adoption.

15. While far beyond the scope or capabilities of this paper to encompass the whole field of recommended action, it is appropriate to indicate how that action might be applied in certain of the principal problems now being dealt with by the United Nations.

a. The Provision of Security Forces Under Article 43 of the Charter..

(1) The United States should take the position in the Security Council and the Military Staff Committee that the all important consideration is that the Security Council be afforded the forces contemplated for its efficient functioning. There is no useful purpose to be served by prolonged disputation on questions of principle. How available forces may be utilized can be better determined as occasion arises and when their availability is known. Therefore, the United States offers to make available certain given air, ground and sea forces and is disposed to listen with interest to any similar offer which any other member may wish to make. Thought might be given to the possible advantage of adding to the above United States declaration a statement to the effect that the United States considers it immaterial, if the Security Council, by exercise of the veto, is prevented from “accepting” the forces we offer, since they will be held available by us with or without formal agreement until it becomes abundantly evident that sufficient other forces are likewise available to permit of a reduction in our contribution.

b. The International Control of Atomic Energy.

(1) No system of international control which does not include the USSR can conceivably obviate an atomic armaments race or truly dispel the dread prospect of atomic warfare. However, it is conceivable that this situation could be partially mitigated by avoiding competition among known friends and, instead, enlisting their cooperation toward the maximum collective security in return for the maximum of peaceful nuclear-fission benefits possible under the circumstances.

(2) Since circumstances permit no safe alternative to absolute retention by the United States of its present monopoly and technical headstart, the United States has no recourse except to constitute itself as trustee-custodian of its atomic energy secrets and “know-how” until such time as practical international control becomes possible.

(3) In this role, we might conceivably make available certain peaceful uses and developments to any nation which would agree to essential measures of control. We might further undertake not to use atomic weapons except in self-defense or against an act of aggression as mutually agreed by a majority of other member states in conformity with the aims and principles of the United Nations Charter.

(4) The virtual “atomic alliance” which would thus come into being, would be not so much a deliberate association as it would be the natural sequence of events growing from the existing circumstances. It presents as proximate an approach to the elimination of atomic warfare as can be contrived on any less-than-universal basis of international control. It would leave the door to full international control wide open for Soviet acceptance at any time. Pending such control, it would confine the inevitable atomic armaments race to the USSR and Satellites versus the United States and cooperating nations, as against the general free-for-all which might easily result if no arrangement were to exist whereby we could safely share with anyone else the power and the possible benefits our present monopoly affords.

c. Regulation and Reduction of Armaments and Armed Forces.

(1) Since effective regulation of armaments cannot be achieved in the aura of international distrust created by Soviet intransigeance, the United States should point out the futility of further meetings of the Commission for Conventional Armaments pending the attainment of a degree of international confidence which would warrant resumption of its activities. The United States might further suggest that it would be happy to discuss with any and all nations similarly disposed means whereby their individual burden of armaments might be lightened by possible cooperation in the problems of security, again emphasizing our desire to carry out the aims and purposes of the United Nations Charter as far as actual circumstances will permit.

d. Economic and Social Problems.

(1) Since the absence of the veto greatly reduces the Soviet’s power to thwart action in respect of matters outside the competency of the Security Council, the United States should seek to compensate for the security deficiencies of the United Nations by redoubling our efforts to strengthen its economic and social endeavors. In this connection, the United States might well assume an even more active leadership in solving such problems as the relocation of Displaced Persons, the elimination of hindrances to equitable economic development, and the codification of a system of international law.

1. At its 65th Meeting, August 22, the Executive Committee decided to table this memorandum after Dean Rusk, representing the Department of State, had expressed the opinion that its scope exceeded the purview of RAC. Rusk indicated that the Policy Planning Staff was preparing a paper on the same general subject as the present memorandum; see PPS 7, August 21, p. 602. (Department of State Disarmament Files)