Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, General; The United Nations, Volume I

IO Files: US/A/912

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Harley E. Notter of the United States Delegation Staff of Advisers

secret

[New York,] November 14, 1947.

My conversation at Lake Success with General Romulo today was designed to moderate his known support of the main provisions of the resolution proposed by Indian on the problem of the treatment of the Indians in South Africa, since we were trying to win changes in substance of that resolution.¹ It was broadened immediately by General Romulo to United States relations with his Delegation.

I said that in the temporary absence of our liaison officer at the plenary meeting at Flushing, I had come to him during the discussion in Committee 1 to tell him in advance of our attitude that the three substantive provisions in the resolution proposed by India should all be modified. We did not wish to have a condemnation of either of the two parties, South Africa or India. We felt that the present resolution by affirming last year’s resolution and by basing the projected round-table conversations singly upon that resolution as the basis for those conversations was too narrow and, because it would further antagonize South Africa, it would not promote the real objective—a settlement of the difficulty between the two parties. In the interest of having the problem resolved as expeditiously as possible, we felt that modification of these paragraphs was essential. I said that since he was on the speakers’ list, and would speak before the United States Delegate made his brief remarks, we thought he might like to be apprised of our views in these specific matters even though? we understood that he would oppose our position in general.

He expressed the greatest appreciation for this courtesy and remarked that he agreed with the view I had expressed that we were really dealing in this problem with the social attitudes held by great masses of the people directly concerned, and that, as all thoughtful persons knew, such attitudes were too unwieldy even for governments to move excepting slowly. It should be noted here that in his subsequent speech, which was brilliantly reasoned and was one of the best short speeches made in the present Assembly, he opposed having condemnation of any kind in the resolution and left the door open for widening the basis of the round-table talks to include related issues rather than last year’s resolution solely. He therefore did try to assist us to win our main changes while supporting in general the Indian resolution.

General Romulo immediately broadened the scope of the conversations by remarking that this was the first time that any member of the American Delegation other than the liaison officer, Mr. Dickover, “who is friendly and helpful”, had talked with him on the substance of our views. He said that he had been asked often what he was going to do and how he was going to vote, and that sometimes he had been urged to vote in favor of our position, which he was glad to do whenever his own convictions were not in issue or his announced position had precluded a shift on his part. He said that throughout the time that Mr. Marshall had been here, he had not had a word with the General, though he had done his best in the war to fight successfully to carry out the orders of General Marshall. I broke in there to say that Secretary Marshall preferred not to linger in lounges for conversations but rather to have talks in his office or rooms with whoever wished to do so, and that perhaps Mr. Romulo did not know that Mr. Marshall’s door had been open to such initiative and many had had such talks. He seemed most particularly hurt that he had not had an opportunity “to shake hands” with General Marshall. (Apparently he ignored the opening U.S. reception and meant special personal recognition.) He fully shares the unqualified admiration for Mr. Marshall by all the Delegates here. He remarked that he also had not had conversations with Mr. Austin or other ranking members of the American Delegation, though “of course” they had exchanged greetings as they met each other in the various rooms at the United Nations. I remarked that U.S. Delegates were so busy that much of their conversational work was carried on through the assistance of the advisers. He said he completely recognized that Philippine security and all its other major interests were wrapped up with the interests of the United States, and that the destiny of the Philippines at all times and particularly its fate in the event of war was wholly identified with the United States. He hoped that we might see that if he could be informed of our views in substance, there would be many times when he could support us and help to rally support. As things had gone on heretofore, he had too little direct knowledge through contact with our delegates in person to know enough to proceed even on matters which were of concern directly to his own country “because they were of concern directly to the United States”. “How do you think I feel when I am ignored?”

While stressing his loyalty to the United States, and making clear in various ways his admiration of our delegates and the chief officials in Washington, and in fact basing his next remarks on those feelings, he deplored the weakening of our moral leadership on the questions relating to dependent peoples and the colored independent peoples. He said that the world had changed drastically since the beginning of the war, that the State Department could not seem somehow to realize that the colonial peoples were not going to be content with the step-by-step progress which we seemed so much to emphasize in our policies in the Trusteeship Committee and in other ways, as in the Indonesian case before the Security Council.² At that point I said that he should be the first to realize that the rapid granting of independence to the Philippines had been made possible by reason of the solid fact that the Filipino people had not only asserted their rights and had been willing to go through a process of preparation for independence, but above all, that they had genuinely realized that independence meant responsibilities as well as rights. He said he completely agreed that sense of responsibility and readiness to discharge the duties of independence or self-government were requisite. He then said that he fully appreciated that the Indonesians were not ready for complete self-government and he would be the first to admit this. Nevertheless, he went on, the only way to instill in them the right attitude and to develop their sense of responsibility was to treat them as human beings who did have capacity for self-rule, moderation and discipline. The Netherlands was violating every day the principle that men have to be guided and helped to learn their duty, and they can’t be expected to get that right idea by being shot down. Did the Netherlands give opportunity for their development? In contrast, as he put it, he used the illustration that while the Americans had shot down Filipinos in the early years of our occupation, we had changed as soon as Aguinaldo had been captured; and we had then immediately established schools and started training the people through experience in self-rule step by step to get them ready for independence. “Indonesia now will be independent in a year, still not prepared.” He said that he particularly deplored that the United States had so strongly sided against forcing the Netherlands to adopt conciliatory attitudes and to move on constructive lines of development in Indonesia. He said we were undermining our influence in the Far East among all colored races and ruining the “wonderful” capital we had accumulated by our treatment of the Filipinos.

He said that the United States was now carrying this same “reactionary” attitude over to the treatment of the Indians in South Africa by siding with the Government of South Africa rather than pressing that Government to confer the right to decent treatment on all the depressed groups in the jurisdiction of South Africa. I said that I hoped he would realize how long it had taken—a full generation and more—to prepare the Filipinos for independence, and that the United States was still busy, for another example, preparing Puerto Ricans for self-government. I said that any great social changes took a good deal of time. Even attitudes having nothing to do with the so-called color problems show that fact, as witness the 40-year struggle in the United States to get adoption of the income tax, which was a much fairer tax based on ability to pay than we had ever had in the United States until the end of World War I. He admitted the point but said that since World War II, the colonial peoples were determined to get self-rule at once, and we had better do our best in that direction in order to have the friendship and support of their millions of population—especially their manpower.

He said that he hoped it would be possible for him to have a conversation with General Marshall and if that were not possible, a conversation with some other high official of the Department of State. If that were not possible, he would welcome having me convey some of his views to the members of the Department of State, all of whom he thought deserved great praise for their ability and whose “only fault” so far as he could see was that “you officers of the Department of State held yourselves apart from every one else.” He said that if we had wide enough contacts with other delegations, we would know that we are not popular “down underneath”. The election of Aranha over Evatt had been a protest against the pressure of the United States to elect Dr. Evatt.³ On several other occasions in this Assembly, he said, delegations had to decide whether to support the United States on some broad issue of vital consequence to the world as well as to the United States, or to oppose by way of showing their disapproval of our attitude of making up our minds wholly by ourselves and then “exacting” that all other states rally to our views. He said he did not think that many delegates liked the idea of being taken to the bar for a drink, asked for their views, being told what ours are, and then being asked to change their views and support ours. He said, “Many of them will do it, but still they don’t like it”, though they do not reveal that attitude to us. He said he would say this as coming from one whose friendship and liking for the United States and Americans was wholly unquestioned and unquestionable, and who did not want to see us hurt ourselves—“You people have the moral and practical leadership of the world.”

I thanked him for being so frank, though I hoped and believed we were really a little more cooperative than had appeared in his comments, and I said my colleagues would equally appreciate his wanting to be helpful. He said in return that he hoped this would not be only the first time that he could have a real discussion with members of the United States Delegation and Department of State, and that he very greatly welcomes my coming to him not to ask his support but simply to explain our own views on the question of the Indians in South Africa in advance of his speech. He spoke about an hour later in Committee 1 in the sense indicated above.

Harley Notter

1. For text of the Indian resolution as voted upon by the General Assembly, see GA (II), Plenary, pp. 1612 ff., annex 26; for statement by the United States Delegate to the General Assembly (Fahy) in opposition to the resolution, see ibid., pp. 1129 ff. The United States was opposed to a reaffirmation of the General Assembly’s resolution of December 8, 1946, as called for in the draft Indian resolution, believing that the resolution had been unsuccessful in getting India and South Africa together.
2. For documentation on the Indonesian matter, see vol. vi, pp. 890 ff.
3. This refers to the election of Dr. Oswaldo Aranha of Brazil as President of the General Assembly; for documentation, see pp. 100 ff.