Foreign Relations of the United States, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943

Roosevelt Papers

The Secretary of State to the President ¹

[Washington,] May 10, 1943.

Memorandum for the President

Referring to your memorandum of May 8 for W.S.C., I am in complete agreement that the issue presented in the French situation has come to a head and we must take a definite position that will determine the future of this controversy which, although outwardly between two French factions, may, if permitted to continue, involve both the British and American Governments in difficulties. I say this because the issue at stake is not only the success of our future military operations, but the very future of France itself. I am in complete agreement that either Allied or United Nations military must at the conclusion of hostilities be on hand in France to prevent anarchy and remain just so long as the French people in Metropolitan France, unhampered and unthreatened, need to formulate machinery to carry on a French Government.

It is very evident that the French National Committee is basing its whole policy on the idea that when France is liberated from the Germans, organized elements under de Gaulle may be in control. At the moment, this policy is leading the de Gaullists to attack all French and other elements not with them. To obtain this control, de Gaulle has permitted to come under his umbrella all the most radical elements in France, Under their statement of April 1, the Communists in France, probably the most highly organized political group there today, have announced their insistence that de Gaulle be their leader. The British Government has given its full weight, both financial and official, to the de Gaulle movement so that the active propaganda which has been carried on in this country and in North Africa against any or all elements believed to be insistent upon the free and untrammeled will of the French people to determine their own future has had more weight than would have been otherwise possible. Today, however, we face a situation where de Gaulle’s active political propaganda directed from London immediately threatens the military success against the Axis powers to which we have dedicated our every effort. It cannot but be realized from your message of congratulation for the Allied victory in North Africa² that the real French contribution was given by the French forces under General Giraud, while throughout the period of the battle de Gaulle, through his political agitation directed from London, caused nothing but disturbance and concern to our military commanders.

The remedy for this situation is in our hands today but, if not used, may not be tomorrow. We must reach agreement with the British on the fundamental question as to the future of France and the manner in which the free expression of the French will as to their Government may be obtained. Once this is determined neither de Gaulle nor Giraud personally is an issue. If we cannot reach agreement with the British on this fundamental point, then the one thing left is candidly to state in your forthcoming conversation that since General Giraud is fully cooperating and contributing to the military purposes we have in view and his military aid in North Africa is an essential in our war effort, we intend to support him in every way as military head of the French Allied forces whose collaboration is not only essential to the British and Americans, but to the cause of the United Nations as well.

1. The Department of State’s file copy of this memorandum bears the following handwritten notation by James C. Dunn, Adviser on Political Relations: “Original handed to the President by the Secretary May 10, 1943.” (851.01/2138) According to Hull, vol. ii, p. 1218, the President, after reading this memorandum, readily agreed with the Secretary’s various points and said he would take them up with Prime Minister Churchill. No American records have been found of the discussions between Roosevelt and Churchill on this subject. In Hinge of Fate, p. 801, Churchill does record, however, that during the time of the Conference, “Not a day passed that the President did not mention the subject [of de Gaulle] to me.” According to the account in Eden, pp. 447–449 Churchill was subjected to “repeated American denunciation” of de Gaulle during the early part of the Conference. Finally, on May 21, 1943, Churchill telegraphed to the British War Cabinet the suggestion that urgent consideration be given to the possibility of withdrawing support from de Gaulle. Eden recalls that after the War Cabinet had counseled against taking such action, Churchill agreed to await the results of negotiations among the French leaders. Churchill telegraphed the War Cabinet on May 24, 1943, that he would tell Roosevelt that the problem would be considered again after he returned to London.

   For additional documentation regarding the concern of the United States over the disunity between Giraud and de Gaulle, see Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. ii, pp. 23 ff.

2. For text of Roosevelt’s message of May 9, 1943, to Giraud, see Department of State Bulletin, vol. viii, May 15, 1943, p. 427.