740.00118 European War 1939/142: Telegram
The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 3—2 a.m.]
162. I yesterday accompanied Colonel Donovan3 to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs where we spent more than 2 hours with the Foreign Minister.4 At my request an interpreter was present and a double check was thus had on what was said.
Presenting Colonel Donovan I said that as the Minister was doubtless aware he had recently visited a number of Mediterranean and contiguous countries where he had talked to heads of governments, [Page 882] Foreign Ministers, and other authorized spokesmen; that he was now nearing the conclusion of his European visit and was desirous of discussing matters with the Minister with a view to making an appropriate report on his return to the United States. I added that this distinguished visitor was familiar in general also with our relations with Spain and the desire of our country to learn more fully what its situation and needs were.
Prior to responding to specific questions from Colonel Donovan, the Minister gave a background of the recent civil war, emphasizing the point that in this conflict the democracies of the world had been in opposition to Spain, and that his country had been delivered from a period of disorder and violence (under which democratic principles were nullified), by so-called totalitarian countries and that naturally and as a result the gratitude of Spain flowed toward those countries. The arch enemies of Spain in this conflict, he continued, had been France and England whose Governments had entirely failed to recognize the basic principles involved and had encouraged in every way in their power the so-called Republican Government. The Minister then recalled with indignation and bitterness the failure of Ambassadors and other Chiefs of Mission during the civil war to mitigate by their physical presence and effort the reign of blood and terror which had existed in the capital and elsewhere, recalling cases where asylum had been refused to people who shortly thereafter were assassinated.
Colonel Donovan in pointing out that he had visited the Franco4a troops at the front, and was himself a Catholic, emphasized that there were 20 million and more of the same creed in the United States, equally made clear that the Franco leaders had entirely ignored the rise of propaganda as a result of which that public opinion in the United States which would have been favorable to the cause was left bewildered through lack of information—all this in sharp contrast to the activities of Republican representatives.
The most significant statement made by the Minister was a textual declaration that “we hope for and believe in the victory of Germany in the present conflict”. He added this was the opinion of his Government as well as of the youth of Spain, the latter feeling convinced that a German victory would be to the best interests of the country. (The Minister under cross-examination here said that by the word “youth” he meant those who were young in their attitude toward the object of the present situation!)
The Minister was then asked why he desired a German victory. He replied that first of all it was because of gratitude arising from its contribution to Spain’s present independence referred to above and equally in resentment of England’s and France’s attitude in the Spanish Civil War and further that he felt that Spain’s legitimate [Page 883] aspirations based on her “natural rights” would be safeguarded if the hoped for event became a fact.
Colonel Donovan inquired what would become of the other countries of Europe under a dominate [sic] Germany. The Minister replied that France and Belgium would receive special consideration and that there would be a general control of other countries in accordance with German ideas. He could not see any danger to the United States or to other American countries arising out of this situation. It was British propaganda that provoked uneasiness. He also remarked here that a nation of 80 million Germans was sufficiently large to impose its will on all Europe as well as to protect greater component states from the horrors of communism coming from the East. Being further queried along this same line as to what Spain would gain, he said it would surely receive Gibraltar together with a further recognition of Spain’s “natural rights” in Africa.
Colonel Donovan then asked what he thought would happen in the event of a British victory. The Minister answered that in such a contingency it was out of the question to expect a country of the limited population of the British Isles to “impose a bourgeois government” on the rest of Europe. Furthermore in such a case Europe would be an impoverished congeries of peoples too weak to resist the Red attack referred to.
Pressing the matter further Colonel Donovan inquired how Britain’s defeat was to be brought about. The Minister declared that the issue would be settled in British waters and within the British Isles. Admitting the apparent success in Great Britain and Greece, in Albania and in Africa he said that only “prestige” was affected thereby; that were conditions reversed the final result would not be altered. While admitting the wonderful spirit shown by the British people, the Minister added there was a limit to this form of human endurance and that hunger plus incessant bombing would effectively end all resistance. (The Minister seemed to leave Japan entirely out of the picture as he did equally the United States!)
Pursuing his examination Colonel Donovan asked the flat question whether Spain intended to remain out of the conflict. The reply to this was that it would remain aloof until Spain’s “honor or interests or dignity” were in question.
Asked concerning activities of foreign governments in Spain, the Minister declared that England and France had always intervened in the affairs of the country and that England is intervening today. He followed this with the astonishing declaration that stories of German infiltration and intervention in Spain were part of British propaganda; that there was nothing of the kind nor was any diplomatic pressure being applied against Spain by the German Government. Colonel Donovan countered this vigorously, declaring that while he [Page 884] did not pretend to speak of Spain he was thoroughly informed regarding German propaganda and pressure of various kinds in the United States and in every country he had visited, and that it was only reasonable to suppose that something of the same kind went on here. This, together with other information which he had acquired confirmed his belief, Colonel Donovan said, that the instinct of the American people had led them aright in causing them to envisage a German victory not alone as a menace to them but to their liberties. Colonel Donovan continued by remarking that undoubtedly the Minister had read the speeches of President Roosevelt, and emphasized that these speeches not alone represented the views of the President and the Administration but were also the expression of the conviction of the great majority of the American people.
Colonel Donovan then spoke at some length of the gigantic material program now going on in the United States which would soon be well into its stride, of the huge army thoroughly armed and equipped now being molded, with other significant points emphasizing what this meant in the scales of victory for Britain.
Colonel Donovan also told the Minister that he had learned from his own observation and otherwise of the general economic needs of Spain; that he was aware that I had made these generally known to our Government; that he was desirous of contributing in any way he could to a sympathetic consideration of these necessities; that he proposed discussing this subject with the British Ambassador here and perhaps with the British Government in London; and that on his return to the United States, now fixed for an early date, he would equally make these needs known. This gave the Minister the opportunity to speak of the terrific destruction in field and forest and factory, in transportation, et cetera, in Spain pointing out that other countries which had engaged only in wars beyond their boundaries had secured loans for their rehabilitation while Spain of today was not alone suffering from the destruction of the past but on every frontier was feeling the repercussion of the present conflict.
In conclusion Colonel Donovan told the Minister of his satisfaction in having been able to see him and to have this frank discussion, having delayed his visit to Portugal to confer with a high personality there in order to do so. The Minister interrupted him here to express his pleasure in the visit. Continuing, the Colonel said that he was disappointed, however, that despite my efforts it has not been found possible to secure an interview with the Caudillo5 whom he desired to see, having in mind the interest of Spain and nothing involving him personally. The Minister mumbled something intended to be consolatory but which was entirely indefinite.
[Page 885]As a postscript to the foregoing it should be stated that I telephoned to the Minister about 8 o’clock in the evening, recalled my two notes and our conversation relative to the desire of Colonel Donovan to be received by the Caudillo, and inquired if this could be arranged: The Minister replied that he feared this would be impossible since the Caudillo was “very busy”.
While nothing that is reported above is startlingly new, and certainly it is not at variance with reports submitted by this Mission in recent months, perhaps at no time have the views of the Spanish Government in the matter of the present conflict, expressed through its official spokesman been stated with such clarity and directness. However, it does not alter the opinions which I expressed in my telegram No. 76, January 29, 5 p.m. (more especially the recommendations in the four last paragraphs), and I would reiterate that our policy in dealing with this Government should be one of bald realism dictated by a careful determination of what Spanish neutrality is worth to the general cause and how it should be secured.