893.102S/2353: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
[Received 5:25 p.m.]
557. 1. The French Ambassador came to see me at his request on October 31. In the course of the ensuing conversation he made reference to the situation at Shanghai, asserting that the chief threat to the integrity of the French Concession in that city now lay in the solution of the Chinese court issue. He elaborated by saying that the Japanese authorities had commenced pressing him about 6 months ago to turn over to the control of the Nanking régime the Chinese courts in the French Concession; that he had for some time put off the Japanese with various pretexts; but that recently the Japanese military authorities had intervened and were insisting on a settlement of the issue in line with their desires. The Ambassador went on to say he felt that further delay was inadvisable and that he had therefore made a suggestion to the Chinese Foreign Office along the lines set forth in Shanghai’s 1163, October 28, 6 p.m., that is, that the present Chinese court officials would receive appointments from the National Government and the régime in Nanking. He then asserted that the Chungking authorities had refused to entertain his proposal and that he therefore might find it necessary to take action without their consent with a view to satisfying Japanese desiderata. Apart from an observation to the effect that I had felt all along that the Chinese Government authorities would not assent to an arrangement which was tantamount to vesting in the Japanese or their creatures control of the courts at Shanghai, I refrained from comment.
2. Under date of October 24 the Chinese Foreign Minister wrote me a letter, a copy of which went forward to the Department in my air mail despatch No. 689 of October 25,59 stating that he had received reliable information to the effect that the Japanese contemplated seizure of the courts at Shanghai within the “next few weeks” commencing with the courts in the French Concession with a view to handing them over to the “puppet régime”. He expressed the hope that I would communicate the foregoing information to the American Government in order that a “firm stand may be adopted against pressure and the necessary steps taken in time to cope with the situation.”
I have now received a further note dated October 31, this time from the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, relating that a report has been received from the Chinese court authorities in the French Concession at Shanghai to the effect that the French Consulate General [Page 826] at Shanghai has urged the Chinese courts in the French Concession to accept one of two alternatives: (a) complete evacuation of the Settlement or (b) acceptance of appointment from the régime at Nanking. The Vice Minister added in his letter that the French Ambassador had not only confirmed the suggestion of the French Consul General60 but had expressed the hope that the Chinese Government would accept alternative (b) as related above.
The Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs pointed out that seizure of the courts would jeopardize foreign as well as Chinese interests; that acceptance by court officials of appointments from Nanking would be equivalent to placing the courts under Japanese control and that such control of the British [French] Concession courts would be followed by endeavors to assume control of the courts in the International Settlement. The Vice Minister concluded that the French authorities appear to be in no position to resist Japanese demands and asserted that it is the Chinese Government’s hope that the American Government will tender appropriate advice to the French Government and “take such other strong steps as [might?] frustrate any Japanese attempt to seize the Chinese courts in the foreign controlled areas of Shanghai.”
3. It would appear from the foregoing that the court issue at Shanghai is about to come to a head as a result of Japanese pressure on the French authorities. I feel that with the example of Indochina before us there is little probability that the French authorities would be swayed by any “advice” that we might tender them in respect of the courts. As the French Ambassador expressed it to me on October 31, the French are “aware of the realities of the situation” and with this concept in mind they are placating and making concessions to the Japanese in an endeavor to salvage what they can of their interests in the Far East.
With the July 7 and the Sector B incidents before us as examples of Japanese intransigeance, it is highly doubtful whether representations at this time to Tokyo in regard to the Shanghai courts would be of any value; yet in the light of a seeming Japanese tendency to climb down from the policy [of?] bluster displayed immediately after the signing of the Tripartite Pact, an approach to Tokyo might have a temporarily restraining effect. If such a course proved ineffective we might, as has been suggested, take steps to place the courts of the International Settlement, at least, under the control of the Shanghai Municipal Council. Here again the cooperation of the Japanese as having equal interest in the Settlement would have to be obtained. I do not see how we can go beyond this latter action [Page 827] in relation to the Shanghai courts which are after all a part of the whole Shanghai issue and, only in lesser degree, of the whole Far Eastern problem, unless we are willing to take positive steps to demonstrate to Japan that we intend to prevent further encroachment upon our interests in Shanghai in particular and in the Far East in general.
4. I am acknowledging the Vice-Minister’s letter as referred to in paragraph No. 2 above and informing him that I have referred the matter to my Government for its information and consideration.
Sent to the Department, repeated to Peiping and Shanghai. Shanghai please air mail code text to Tokyo.