793.94/16175: Telegram
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 12—4:10 p.m.]
825. 1. The Minister for Foreign Affairs asked me to call this afternoon and for 1 hour and 20 minutes discussed the Shanghai Marines incident of July 747 and the question of the defense sectors.
2. With regard to the incident of July 7, the Minister repeated his former allegation that Colonel Peck and Major General Miura were on the point of reaching a final settlement of the incident when the Department of State intervened and rendered the ensuing attitude of Admiral Glassford and Colonel Peck completely “adamant”. I replied as formerly that this was not my understanding of the facts (Department’s 316, August 20, 6 p.m.48) and I thereupon went over the entire history of the incident as it appears in our correspondence with the Department and Shanghai. The Minister took issue with nearly every point and the resulting argument was wholly inconclusive. The Minister said that the negotiations in Shanghai have finally been broken off and that the net result is a general feeling of friction and irritation.
3. The Minister then discussed at great length the controversy of the defense sectors. He said that the Japanese military and naval authorities in Shanghai feel that the decision of the Defense Committee has the appearance of having been forced by the American authorities on the Japanese through a majority vote and he invoked the procedure of the League of Nations in what he referred to as similar circumstances to support the Japanese thesis that only unanimous consent could govern. He said that he considered it unfortunate that the American authorities had failed to “give an appearance of taking the Japanese commanding officers into their confidence at the very beginning.” In reply I said that in my opinion there could be no proper comparison between the League of Nations procedure to which he had referred, and I then discussed the vote along the lines of the Department’s 321, August 23, 6 p.m., the contents of [Page 813] which had already been brought to the Minister’s attention in our conversation of August 27. This also led to no meeting of minds.
4. The Minister then said that today the Japanese Minister of War,49 being “extremely irritated”, had been on the point of instructing the commanding officer in Shanghai to break off the negotiations when he, Mr. Matsuoka, had asked him to suspend action for “a few days” until he could appeal through me to the American Government to agree to what he regarded as a reasonable settlement. He said that if the American forces should march into Sector B he was certain that the Japanese forces would likewise march into that sector and that a serious clash which might lead to war would then be inevitable. He appealed to me to obviate that danger. His proposal is that both Sectors B and D shall continue for the present in charge of the Volunteer Corps and that if any apprehension as to peace and order should arise, which he doubts, “let the interested powers augment the police force and all will work out to the satisfaction of the residents.” This proposal to augment the police force in case of necessity, the Minister said, represents only his own point of view. At the conclusion of the foregoing remarks I pointed out again the reasons why the continued retention of the Volunteer Corps on military duty appears not practicable. The Minister, however, asked me to report his views to my Government and expressed the hope that a favorable reply might be received soon because he doubted his ability to hold the Minister of War in line very long. He did not say what would happen if the negotiations were broken off.
5. In the course of the conversation the Minister referred regretfully to the “threats” which I had conveyed to him on August 27. I immediately repeated to him with emphasis the messages which I had sent him through the Vice-Minister on September 4 (my request in my telegram of September 4, 11 p.m. and 792, September 4, midnight).
6. Mr. Matsuoka said that he still regarded these two incidents in Shanghai as small local affairs compared to the big issues involving the relations between the United States and Japan. He said that he himself was not responsible for the great accumulation of troubles that had arisen between our two countries before he took office but that he was firmly resolved to settle those difficulties as fast as he could get at them and he wished through me to appeal to the President and Mr. Hull to accept the assurance that he genuinely proposes to do everything in his power to improve our relations and “to correct past troubles.” “Why take a chance of turning these small affairs into causes of irritation and danger to our relations which are bad enough as they are?” he asked. I asked the Minister just how long he had [Page 814] been in office. He said,“50 days”. I inquired whether he was aware that even during those 50 days reports were steadily coming across my desk of the bombings of American property in various parts of China. The Minister expressed astonishment (in spite of our constant notes to the Foreign Office) and asked me for the facts in detail. I said that I would shortly give him a complete list.
7. In the entire conversation no allegation of the Minister was allowed to pass unanswered but in spite of a forceful presentation of our attitude on every point raised I departed with a reluctant sense of complete frustration.
8. A portion of the Department’s 344, September 10, 6 p.m. was received subsequent to my interview with the Minister, but as some sections have not yet come in it seems best to send the present report without delay. I shall therefore await the Department’s reply to my present report before acting on Department’s 344.
Sent to the Department, repeated to Shanghai.