893.102S/2247: Telegram
The Consul at Shanghai (Butrick) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 5—3:15 p.m.]
875. In accordance with intention previously reported to Department and Tokyo, Glassford resumed conversations with Iwamura this morning at 11 a.m.
Glassford stated that at the time of the cessation of their informal conversations the American authorities acquiesced in the temporary arrangement proposed by the Japanese authorities that the Shanghai Volunteer Corps take over Sector B; that sufficient time had now elapsed for further consideration of the entire question, that there had been an exchange of views between the two Governments, that the American side had been quite willing to acquiesce in the temporary arrangement to give time for full consideration by all concerned and that it now seemed that an effort should be made to reach a final agreement. The American Government during this intervening period had continued in the opinion that the compromise solution agreed upon by a majority of the Defense Committee members is entirely reasonable and just from the standpoint of all parties and that the American side, therefore, hoped the Japanese authorities were now in position to acquiesce in a compromise solution.
Iwamura stated that he had received official reports regarding the Washington-Tokyo conversations and that so far as he was aware no conclusion had been reached.
Glassford replied that he was similarly informed with respect to the exchange of views between the two Governments and that with respect to the conclusion of his own Government it is very clear that it has concluded that the compromise solution should be made effective at the earliest possible date and that naturally in a friendly spirit his Government desired the agreement of the Japanese to this.
Iwamura stated that the Japanese Government likewise desires a fair solution; that he had thoroughly studied the matter and felt [Page 802] that the following two points should not constitute the basis of any discussions between them:35
(1) In the discussions of these and similar questions among commanders of different countries such as the commanding officers of Shanghai Defense forces, decisions should not be reached by majority vote. [In any case] Majority vote should not be imposed upon a dissenting member or members of any such international group of military commanders or authorities [, to whom the question involved is one of vital concern] when vital interests are involved. Representatives of powers who are deeply concerned in any issue of such international importance should be in agreement before any action is taken and a decision should be only by a unanimous vote among those vitally concerned. Otherwise it should be considered invalid. The Admiral stated that he could not carry on further discussions on the basis of a proposal or a plan upon which there has not been that measure of agreement.
The Admiral stated as followos, with the remark that he wished these observation to be completely off the record:
He desired that what he had to say at this particular time be omitted from the minutes if there was any possible chance that they would be misunderstood as official in any sense. He stated that there was gossip among certain Japanese [had gotten the impression] officers that collusion had been exercised between the British and American authorities previous to the meeting of the Shanghai Defense Committee. It was known that in the subsequent approval of the Shanghai Municipal Council of the compromise plan agreed upon by a majority vote of the Shanghai Defense Committee, only the votes of the British and American members of the Council were taken. Such being the case the view had spread abroad among certain Japanese that [there was urgent need of a more thorough internationalization of the Settlement.] the reputed international character of the government by the Municipal Council was not a fact. Thus all the more did certain Japanese feel a sense of real aggravation against the so-called majority vote within the Defense Committee itself. Vice Admiral Iwamura explained that there was no imputation of collusion by him and that he expressed the desire that the above remarks remain off the record for fear there might be implied in some quarters an indication of bad faith by himself, which was not the case.
(2) The Admiral stated that in the course of past conversations that it was stated that it would be impossible for the United States Government to countenance entry of Japanese forces into Sector “B”. The Admiral then continued that he must state emphatically in this [Page 803] connection that it is similarly impossible for the Japanese Government to countenance the entry of American forces into Sector “B”.
Having stated the above two points as conditions limiting further discussions between us he expressed himself as anxious that a solution for the preservation of peace and order in Shanghai, which will be fair and equitable for both the United States and the Japanese, should be found.
Glassford stated that he desired to comment on the two points, that with all the emphasis at his command he wished Iwamura to know that the view of his Government was what it considers a just and reasonable solution of the question under discussion, is not based necessarily as it might appear to Iwamura on any major vote of the Shanghai Defense Committee, and that it is his firm view that this solution is the one which his Government desires irrespective of the vote of the Shanghai Defense Committee. The majority vote on the compromise proposal which differed from the original American proposal simply tends to uphold the view of the American Government and that so far as the vote is concerned the American Government might well regret that it was not unanimous and that there should have been a dissenting vote within the Committee, but that the view of the American Government definitely was not necessarily based on the vote. Moreover, the American Government, Glassford felt, would naturally incline to favor [a] majority in any such question, always entertaining the possibility and even the probability of a minority to which consideration is ever given and will be given, of course, in this case. However, it cannot be doubted that in spite of the vital interests of any minority the majority can govern procedure. This should obtain in the present case if the vote is to be considered at all. A minority should always defer to a majority if any concerted action between all parties concerned is expected.
Regarding point 2, Glassford corrected Iwamura [by] stating that in prior conversations it had not been said that it would be impossible for the United States to countenance the entry of Japanese forces into Sector (B). It was said that in Glassford’s belief his Government was not prepared to discuss the entry of Japanese forces into additional sectors or areas of the Settlement. Glassford continued:
“You say that you must state emphatically that it is impossible for the Japanese Government to countenance the entry of American forces into Sector (B). Please then allow me to say that it is my opinion that further conversations between us with respect to this question on the basis of the impossibility of the Japanese Government to countenance the entry of American forces into Sector (B) will serve no useful purpose and I, therefore, am reluctantly forced to ask you to excuse me, at least for the time being.”
Iwamura stated then38 that the Japanese were anxious to find a mutually satisfactory solution and he would like to report to Admiral Shimada and perhaps hold another meeting in the afternoon. Glassford reminded Iwamura that if the Japanese authorities adhere to their views expressed above a further meeting would serve no useful purpose. Iwamura then said that if they had another conference it might be considered a continuation of the present conversation. Thereupon Glassford agreed to meet Iwamura at 3 p.m.
At the stated time Glassford again met Iwamura at the latter’s residence. Iwamura stated that on the basis of their exchange of views in the morning he had consulted with Admiral Shimada, Commander-in-Chief of the China Seas Fleet, and had drawn up the compromise proposal. He then handed Glassford a document, labeled “Memorandum No. 3”, stating that in presenting this compromise plan he felt that no further explanation as to its purport was necessary in view especially of the statements set forth in his previous memoranda numbers 1 and 2. Memorandum follows:
“(1) In a body such as the Shanghai Defense Committee whose membership is comprised of the commanding officers of the forces of the various powers stationed in Shanghai, decisions should be based on complete agreement at least of all the members, for whom the issue involved is one of vital concern. I must make it clear that it is absolutely impossible for us to accept an arrangement whereby a resolution adopted by a majority of that committee is imposed upon a member who has voted against the resolution. I should therefore like to discuss this question with the understanding that the idea of decisions by majority vote should not be considered as a basis of our discussions.
(2) You (Admiral Glassford) recently stated that you felt the United States Government were not prepared to discuss the occupation by Japanese forces of any additional area within the International Settlement. Similarly, I must repeat here that the Japanese Government are not prepared to discuss any similar action by American forces.
With those two considerations as basis, I have made a careful study of the views we exchanged during our past conversations. I feel that to leave the local situation in its present unsettled state is not very desirable from the standpoint either of the future peace and order in Shanghai or of the future of Japanese-American relations. In view, moreover, of the defense situation that has prevailed here during the considerable time that has elapsed since my written memorandum was submitted to you, I desire in a spirit of mutual conciliation [Page 805] and notwithstanding that the issue involved is one of life or death for Japan, to submit a final compromise plan which I would add represents the maximum concession possible on our part.
Proposal:
Sector[s] (B) and (D) to remain exactly as left by the evacuation of the British forces, with neither the American nor Japanese forces making any new claims relative thereto.”
After reading the memorandum, Glassford stated,
“I wish to state that the compromise proposal that you have just handed to me is fully understood and that no further explanation is necessary so far as I am concerned. I wish to repeat what I said this morning that in my belief no useful purpose will be served by further discussion in regard to this matter as the proposal in our view is not acceptable. I will, however, of course transmit the proposal to my superiors and will confirm as soon as possible my view which I have already stated that it will be useless for us to continue our conversations on the basis set forth by you in your memorandum No. 3, to wit, that Sectors (B) and (D) are to remain exactly as left by the evacuation of the British forces, with neither the American nor the Japanese Governments making any new claims relative thereto.”
Reference to memorandum No. 3 and memorandum No. 2 is contained in my 811 to the Minister [Department].39
I should add here that while it is perhaps incorrect to say that the Japanese have taken over Sector D, uniformed armed Japanese presumably gendarmes are garrisoned and patrolling in that sector. Japanese gendarmes have previously operated to a more limited extent in Sector D.
Department please inform Navy.
Sent to the Department, repeated to Peiping, Chungking, Tokyo.
- For the telegraphic summary of these points, the following five paragraphs have been substituted from text of minutes of conversation written by Rear Admiral Glassford. The corrections indicated are those made by Admiral Iwamura as explained in his letter of September 6 to Admiral Glassford, reported by the Consul at Shanghai in despatch No. 3422, September 7 (893.102S/2303). Canceled type indicates portions to be omitted and bracketed words portions to be inserted.↩
- In the text of minutes of conversation, Admiral Glassford added the following at this point: “With regard to what you have just pointed out as a misquotation of the remarks you made on an earlier occasion, what I wanted to say was that the Japanese attitude toward the question of the relation of American forces to Sector (B) is identical with what you stated to be the American attitude toward the relation of Japanese forces to Sector (B)”.↩
- August 21, 4 p.m., p. 782.↩