893.102S/2205: Telegram

The Consul at Shanghai (Butrick) to the Secretary of State

804. Continuing my 798, August 19, 4 p.m. regarding Shanghai defense sectors. As in all matters we have endeavored to be reasonable and fair, it was felt that we should listen to and consider any statements or proposals which the Japanese might make, although we ourselves felt that the compromise solution passed by a majority of the Defense Committee was most fair and reasonable. It stationed [Page 776] the American defense forces entirely within the Settlement while the Japanese defense forces would be left occupying both Settlement and extra-Settlement areas. While by far the greater part of the water front would remain in the Japanese defense sector, the Marines by taking over Sector B would have in their defense sector some of the water front also. If the Japanese were to take over Sector B or were in effect to control it, although the defense sector were allotted to the Volunteer Corps or left unallotted, there would be little assurance of free access to the Whangpoo in case of necessity.

Admiral Glassford has handed me memoranda of his conversations with Vice Admiral Iwamura. They are subject to confirmation by the latter before being considered as entirely authentic.

During the first conversation on the morning of August 17, nothing particular was developed other than the presentation of the Japanese statement previously transmitted to the Department and a request for a statement of the American position. Iwamura said, however, that when he had the statement of the American position, he felt sure that he could, together with his Commander in Chief, produce a formula which would serve as a basis for further discussions and that the formula might be even produced that same day. On the afternoon of August 17, the statement of the American position was handed to Iwamura by Admiral Glassford who said that it represented his private opinion, which opinion was partly shared with Admiral Hart. Admiral Glassford stated that the Japanese position was thoroughly understood, that a de facto war was in progress with China, that part of China was in control of forces from without which rendered the situation different from what it had been in the past but that there was, however, no assurance that the old conditions would not be restored. Admiral Glassford then pointed out that the points brought out in the Japanese statement and the argument contained therein could be used to justify the complete elimination of forces other than Japanese from the International Settlement as well as to support the present argument against the extension of the marine sector within the Settlement. Admiral Glassford stated that he hoped that he was not to be confronted by evidence that such an unreasonable attitude would be adopted by the Japanese. Iwamura was quick to see his point and was emphatic in his denial that he held any idea whatever of asking the Marines to evacuate the Settlement altogether. He added further that if the State Department should, like Admiral Glassford, read any such design on his [part] into his statement, he asked that the American Government be disabused of any such idea. A further meeting took place early on the evening of the 17th.28

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Iwamura said he had studied the American statement and as the Japanese and American views were so divergent, conversation on the basis of those statements seemed impossible. He then observed that the people of Japan were keenly interested in the Shanghai situation. Admiral Glassford countered that the American people were no less keenly interested in the Shanghai situation. Iwamura then stated that he would present his formula, adding that the Japanese considered Sector B as the heart of all activities on the lower Yangtze River and that too much importance could not be given to this Japanese conception. Admiral Glassford stated that he viewed Sector B likewise as regards Americans. Iwamura then proposed that the Japanese occupy D Sector and that no country occupy B Sector. He asked for consideration of his proposal. Admiral Glassford then replied as follows: that the proposal was understood; that he felt the American Government was not prepared to discuss the occupation by Japanese troops of any additional area within the International Settlement; and that the American Government would doubtless regard with keen disappointment Iwamura’s proposal which was tantamount to an admission by the Japanese officials that the American point of view was not accepted by them as reasonable and just. However, in view of the fact that the Japanese did not propose to occupy any further area within the Settlement, he, Glassford, felt that the proposal could be given consideration and that he would submit it to the Commander in Chief.

A further meeting was held Sunday morning, August 18, after conference at the Consulate.

At that meeting Glassford informed Iwamura that the matter had been considered, that the Americans saw no objection to the Japanese troops taking over Sector D, but that as regards the Japanese arguments against the occupation of Sector B by the Marines, they were equally applicable to a complete withdrawal of the Marines, and it appeared that the Japanese design was to have the Shanghai Volunteer Corps take over Sector B for the purpose of keeping out the United States Marines. Iwamura was reminded that the Japanese themselves on a previous occasion had stated that the Volunteer Corps was incompetent to take over a defense sector and that therefore, by inference, the Japanese considered the Marines a less efficient organization than one which they had already repudiated. Glassford then pressed for an explanation from the Japanese as to their real objection to the Marines occupying Sector B and added that in his opinion the United States Government was not prepared to discuss any change with respect to the defense forces which in its opinion would militate against the international character of the Settlement. Therefore, the [Page 778] American position adhered to the compromise plan approved by the Defense Committee and the Municipal Council and Iwamura was urged to reconsider. Glassford stated that the American view was that if the Marines should take over Sector B from the British there would be no change in the international aspects of the situation in that area, whereas the Japanese seem to be attempting to take advantage of the withdrawal of British troops in a way tantamount to admitting that a change in the general situation in Sector B was desired by them. Glassford emphasized that this was the positive view of the American authorities and he asked for an explanation why the change was desired and what should be the nature of the change. Iwamura stated that the matters were of such importance that he preferred to convey [answer] in writing. He maintains that he had intended no aspersions on the Marines and that he felt that the presence of organized troops in Sector B in support of the Shanghai Volunteer Corps and the Marines would be advantageous. In the interest of a speedy solution he urged that it be agreed upon that the Shanghai Volunteer Corps take over Sector B and added that as there would be Marines and Japanese in adjacent sectors which could be called upon in the event of emergency, there was no reason for apprehension in regard to the incompetency and inefficiency if it existed of the Shanghai Volunteer Corps. Iwamura asked if Glassf ord’s remarks were virtually those of Admiral Hart and was informed they were. He asked if they were the fundamental views of the United States Government and whether Admiral Hart had been specifically instructed in regard to the proposals to be considered [as] made previous night. Glassford informed him that Hart was acting on instructions from the Navy Department. There followed a frank discussion as to the value of proposal B to the Americans and Japanese, both sides stating that it was of great importance to their respective interests, the Americans feeling that its international status would be jeopardized unless the Marines took over from the British or the British remained. Iwamura stated that in the Japanese view the International Settlement would become far more internationalized should the Japanese troops take over for the reason that then Japanese interests hitherto excluded would be looked out for.

It was agreed that a further meeting be held.

On the morning of the 19th at the next meeting Iwamura stated that he had received a telegram from the Japanese Navy stating that the American Consul General [Embassy] in Tokyo had approached the Japanese Foreign Office with the information that the State Department supported the compromise plan of the Defense Committee and [Page 779] that American troops will succeed to the responsibilities of the British troops by occupying Sector B. The Japanese Government is quite opposed to this move and if the American troops go into the sector unilaterally, the Japanese troops would probably go in also and a lamentable and confusing situation would arise which the Japanese Government does not wish to happen and which it is supposed the American Government likewise does not desire. The Foreign Office has asked the American Embassy to send instructions that Marines not enter Sector B and he hoped such instructions had been received and under instructions of Admiral Shimada he asked that the Marines not enter Sector B until an agreement is reached. He said that the Japanese would not take the initiative but that, if the Americans enter, a lamentable situation would arise. Glassford then asked Iwamura for replies to his questions of the previous day. Iwamura stated that it would take several days and that it was his view that documents now being prepared by him for submission to Glassford would in reality constitute further Japanese views on this subject to facilitate a final solution. Glassford then stated that Admiral Hart had received instructions in regard to the American procedure and handed him the following:

“The United States Marines will postpone their carrying out of the compromise plan passed by the majority of the Defense Committee, and as a temporary measure, pending the outcome of negotiations in progress on the subject between the American and Japanese Governments, the American authorities acquiesce in the proposal that the Shanghai Volunteer Corps relieve the British garrison in Sector B.”

Iwamura read the document and expressed his satisfaction therewith. Glassford then stated that Admiral Hart would immediately take action in accordance with the foregoing decision and asked Iwamura to convey this decision as from Admiral Hart to Admiral Shimada. Glassford stated that as negotiations were in progress between the American and Japanese Governments it was quite possible that further negotiations between them would have to be discontinued. With usual cordial amenities the conference concluded.

While not mentioned in the memoranda, Glassford stated orally that at the last interview Iwamura was visibly agitated and that upon reading the statement above referred to he leaned back in his chair, muttered an “ah”, and patted his stomach in an air of relief as though a heavy burden had been lifted from his shoulders.

Department please inform Navy.

Sent to the Department and Tokyo, repeated Chungking and Peiping.

Butrick
  1. For Japanese version, see second paragraph of telegram No. 829, August 23, 6 p.m., from the Consul at Shanghai, p. 791.