793.94/16245: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson)
181. Your 526, October 18, 2 [9] p.m.97 I desire that you call upon Chiang Kai-shek and that you make to him orally a statement along lines substantially as follows:
Both the President and I have examined attentively the message which Chiang Kai-shek communicated through you,98 and we are giving it our best thought.
We of course desire to see a durable and genuine peace reestablished in the Far East as soon as possible. We believe that such a peace can be restored only on lines which are consistent with principles of equity and justice in relation to all concerned. We would be lacking in candor if we did not state our view that the evidence available to us does not indicate that Japan’s military leadership would be prepared at this time to enter into a settlement which would be fair to all concerned.
Both the American people and their Government are sympathetically aware of the internal as well as the external difficulties which have confronted and continue to confront China, and we have profound [Page 680] admiration for the way in which China has met and is continuing to meet those difficulties.
We are surprised at the statement in regard to the cessation of aid from Russia. The information which we had previously received from various sources has been to the effect that, although there has been no increase and perhaps somewhat of a decrease in supplies from Russia, the sending of such supplies has continued.
With regard to the question of economic aid from the United States, there is of course no need to recount the various steps which the United States has already taken which have had the effect of assisting China. Chiang Kai-shek is fully familiar with those steps. With regard to the current situation, the Federal Loan Administrator announced at his press conference on October 17 that he was conferring with T. V. Soong, President of the Bank of China, on the subject of further advances of credits to China in exchange for essential defense products needed by the United States. The matter of further credits or loans is thus receiving active attention at this time.
With regard to the making available to the Chinese Government of military supplies, especially airplanes, we have made a review of the record of exports of airplanes to China. This review shows that since July 1, 1937, licenses have been approved for the exportation from the United States to China of 279 airplanes; that the value of these airplanes, including parts, has amounted to approximately $22,000,000; that during the calendar year 1937 China occupied first place among foreign purchasers of American aircraft and during the calendar year 1938 third place; and that, although China dropped to twenty-first place during the calendar year 1939, it occupied eleventh place during the first 6 months of 1940, third place during July 1940, and ninth place during August 1940. During the first 8 months of 1940 applications were approved for licenses to export 115 airplanes to China. Of this number 48 airplanes had been exported as of October 1 and 67 had not been exported as of that date. It is understood that a considerable number of American airplanes are now en route to China.
With regard to Chiang Kai-shek’s observations relating to Japanese air attacks upon the Burma road, it seems to us that there is serious question whether Japanese efforts to put the Burma road out of commission through bombing operations are likely to be substantially successful. Such bombing operations are, we understand, most difficult to carry out successfully. Certainly the fortitude, skill, and perseverance shown by the Chinese in keeping open the Canton-Hankow Railway in the face of repeated Japanese bombing attacks offer solid indications of the difficulties in the way of closing lines of communication.
With regard to Singapore, there of course exists danger that Japan may attack that place. Such danger does not seem to us immediately [Page 681] imminent. Japan must realize the serious difficulties, including factors of equipment and of supply, which would attend any such attack and would not, it is believed, lightly embark upon such a venture while Great Britain is still strong in Europe and the American fleet is at Hawaii.
It may be observed further that the situations in Europe and in the Far East are closely interrelated and that the Axis Powers of course desire to bring their plans to fruition before the accelerated rate of production in the United States of military supplies results in substantially increased output and before the rearmament program in this country reaches maximum capacity. This country has already put forth great efforts to accelerate and to expand production. These efforts are continuing and are receiving the Government’s best attention. From the standpoint of prospective output and the ability not only to supply its own needs but also to supply the needs of other countries which are fighting for self-preservation, every month which goes by without the Axis Powers’ having achieved their objectives is so much to the good. For this country’s position and the position of like-minded countries may be expected to become progressively stronger. While the present may be and undoubtedly is an especially critical period, the prospects over a somewhat longer period appear brighter.
The Government of the United States has consistently endeavored in relations with the Far East, while serving the interests of the United States, to avoid and avert disservice to the interests of China. At the present moment we are in no way forgetful of either of these objectives and we are intent upon both. As Chiang Kai-shek is of course aware, it is a traditional policy of the United States, except when this country is at war, to avoid entering into alliances or entangling commitments, although we believe in cooperative effort with other countries by peaceful and practicable means in support of the principles to which this country is committed. Just as Chiang Kai-shek and other Chinese leaders have foremost in their minds the interests of China, so we have foremost in our minds the interests of the United States. We are fortunately situated in that our interests and those of China usually run along parallel lines. Both the United States and China believe in peace, and the United States desires to see China establish and maintain herself along the lines of the democratic ideals in which we believe. It has long been a premise of American policy that the Chinese are capable of creating and maintaining a well-ordered state.
We offer the foregoing observations in regard to the subject matter of Chiang Kai-shek’s communication. We are of course continuing to study the whole matter presented by him in a desire to be constructively [Page 682] helpful where it is appropriate and possible for this Government, acting within the framework of the established policies and laws of the United States, to be so. In our study and in our effort to be helpful we shall expect to confer on various points with the Chinese Ambassador here and with Mr. T. V. Soong.