793.94/16251: Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

529. My 526, October 18, 9 p.m.91 By way of comment I feel that I cannot over-emphasize the remarks set down at the end of my 524, October 17, 7 p.m.,92 reporting my conversation with British Ambassador. It appears that in his conversation with British Ambassador Generalissimo did not mention danger of social collapse due to whispering campaign of Communists and I have not repeated that part of conversation to him as Generalissimo wanted this treated as confidential.

I suggest that we cannot look upon this matter as a mere conflict between Chinese Government and Communism. Chinese Government badly armed and equipped has for 3 years been fighting desperately against invaders, armed and equipped with latest armaments. Chinese Government has from the beginning believed that its cause was our cause. The Chinese know our sympathy is with them and have welcomed that and the moral aid that we have given. All along however both Japanese and Communists have stated that our aid would not go beyond sympathy and moral help. The Chinese people have seen [Page 675] their soldiers pushed away from the coast until today they cannot trade with us except with the permission of the Japanese. They have seen our rights flouted by the Japanese and we have done little or nothing about it in a concrete way. They believe in our desire to help but are losing confidence in our ability or our will to help. All of this plays into the hands of Japanese propagandists who from the beginning have stated that the Chinese were fools to depend upon the white or western peoples for help in Asia where Japan alone controls.

It took courage for the British to reopen the Burma Road and thus expose their interests in the Far East to attack from Japan at a time when they are locked in a deadly struggle for existence in Europe. The Chinese believe that the British could hardly have taken this step without encouragement from the United States. It is difficult for the Chinese to believe that we would take this action without following it up by aid to the British in defending themselves against attack in the Far East by the Japanese. They feel that both Britain and the United States need exceptional help that the Chinese could give in holding the Japanese. It is hard for them to believe that the United States will not help them to defend the Burma route and prevent its being closed by the Japanese, thus shutting them completely off from outside assistance and force them to choose between the Japanese and Communism. They stipulate that Soviet Russia would be more enthusiastic in supporting them if we would give them positive help. By contrast they believe that the Russians would be more likely to give positive aid to a Communist China if our help is not forthcoming. The Chinese Government would find it difficult to turn about now and make peace with Japan.

For 3 years we have maintained our Embassy close to the beleaguered Chinese Government, a constant symbol of our confidence in it and our desire to aid. Our prestige in the Far East is directly challenged. Are we going to abandon everything that we have stood for in treaty and policy or are we going to defend our rights and take positive and active steps to demand of Japan in particular respect for our rights?

We will have to assist the Chinese and the British in keeping open the Burma Road as a symbol of those rights. The Chinese cannot wait until planes are built; they will have to have them at once for today they have neither the planes nor the gasoline to operate them and Japanese controlling the air can bomb the country side at will, a constant reminder to the Chinese population that the power to which they have been led to look for sympathy and aid cannot do anything about it. Nay, the power that has even in the past done nothing to prevent the Japanese finding in our markets the materials necessary [Page 676] to make their campaign a success in China while cutting China off from all contact with the United States.

The statements made to me by the Generalissimo should receive the most serious consideration coming as they do from the head of a Government that has nowhere to look now for help except to us. As I stated above it took courage for the British to reopen the Burma route in the face of Japanese threats. The United States must now back that courage up with such positive aid as to assist in making that route safe. To do otherwise is to put the stamp of validity on all that the Japanese and the Communists have said about the unwillingness of the English and especially the United States to go beyond words in helping the Chinese to stand independently against aggression by a stronger power.

The time for action of a positive character is here and I devoutly hope that the United States is prepared and ready to take it and that soon.

By air to Hong Kong for repetition by cable.

Johnson
  1. Ante, p. 428.
  2. Ante, p. 427.