793.94/16249: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
[Received 4:30 p.m.]
528. My 526, October 18, 9 p.m.90 In view of the importance of this and the exact sense of General Hey’s [Chiang Kai-shek’s] conversation with me of October 18 there follows a close paraphrase of his remarks as taken down and later corrected and approved by him (but not independent of the preliminary exchange of views on international topics to which I alluded in my telegram under reference):
I apprehend that perhaps you and your Government are not being kept apprised of the actual situation in this country and therefore I desire at this moment to take this chance to give you the following information so as [apparent omission] following closure of the Burma route not only American commodities but goods promised by Russia have not reached us. Moreover, the Chinese Communists are giving many indications [of] forsaking completely the maintenance of [apparent omission] in North Kiangsu, especially they have conducted themselves so badly as to hamper the conduct of hostilities. The foregoing is one of the menaces confronting China at this time. It is my desire that the American Government be acquainted with this fact. After closure of the Burma Road and the non-arrival of American supplies, it should be further noted that the probability of Soviet aid to China became remote. No supplies are being received through Sinkiang. As things are at present, the lingual Communist press has not published articles critical of any [my] Government but the Communists have launched verbal onslaughts. This is causing a deterioration of the people’s morale which I acknowledge is not so good as it was a year ago. The prolongation of hostilities is being menaced from within. I want your Government to have the following confidential information which I have hitherto mentioned to no person not even T. V. Soong. Since July new United States loan had not been granted and if the British had not before having [sic] opened the Burma route our economic and social situation would have deteriorated. The foregoing I thus hold to [apparent omission] menace. The Japanese and their design to smash our power we do not fear but deterioration of the people’s morale and the Chinese Communists are truly problems of a serious character. That this situation has improved during the past week is attributable to the removal of restrictions on the Burma route. Accordingly improvement in the Russian attitude toward China has resulted. But if resistance is to be prolonged, the attitude of Soviet Russia maintained, and the morale of the people sustained the positive help of the United States is necessary.
China [apparent omission] air planes and economic assistance. Although the route to Burma has been restored I fear that savage Japanese aerial attacks may render it useless. The opening of the route resulted from the support accorded the British by your President. [Page 673] This factor I regard as the crucial turning point in which defeat has been converted to victory and our most threatening stage successfully passed. Our people and Government are, therefore, most grateful to President Roosevelt. Nevertheless more comprehensive assistance from the United States is necessary and the American authorities are being consulted by T. V. Soong in this respect. We will appreciate any support you can grant us in this connection. The fact that China, regardless of coming developments, desires to continue to concert with Great Britain and America in the Far East, I deem it unnecessary to emphasize, but the element of time is of the essence. In the event that the route to Burma is not usable owing to Japanese bombing, American supplies can not be shipped to us. It is impossible to ship goods through Siberia. A Japanese attack on Singapore would suspend ocean shipping and bring about the same result. If the road is closed or ocean traffic suspended, American assistance will not help us. Time, I wish to emphasize, is of vast importance.
I strongly hope that before the severance of communication facilities American planes can be procured in plentiful quantities. In the hope of obtaining the aid of the United States in this respect, I am despatching a proposal to Soong. Planes are urgently needed; we must have aircraft that are already fabricated to reach China in 3 months in order to uphold the morale of the civil and military population and to continue the struggle. 500 to 1000 planes in a year are required by China of which it is trusted 500 can reach China within the next 3 months before disruption of communications. It is also hoped that American volunteers will be able to aid us in carrying on hostilities. Splendid air bases are possessed in Chekiang Province from which American planes could be utilized to attack Japanese naval bases in Japan and Formosa. China will be able to diminish Japanese naval strength materially if she can obtain from America one-twentieth or one-tenth of the planes Britain is now receiving from the United States. For America the supplying to China of planes and volunteers is a desirable alternative to war with Japan. Provided the American Air Force would work in conjunction with our Army in case of an American-Japanese war, it might not be necessary for the American Fleet to proceed to the Orient, by working together they would be powerful enough to ruin the navy of Japan and thus effect a perpetual solution of Far Eastern difficulties.
If American volunteers cannot be procured, our air force will be trained to fly the new planes. But if the Government of the United States consents, the procurement of volunteers in the United States should be no problem.
It is not necessary for me to stress a point of which you are well aware: in the matter of cooperation among America, China, and England, we will follow the leadership of the United States.
We are thankful for the new loan of $25,000,000 which with other loans of the past two years total $75,000,000. The results have been excellent. But I trust that for further bolstering the morale of the Chinese people, America will see fit to grant a single big loan rather than small piecemeal credits. As I have declared above, it is not the Japanese Army which we fear, because our army is able to deal with [Page 674] it, but the defiant Communists. American economic assistance plus the aid of the American Air Force can stabilize our unsteady economic and social conditions, thus making it impossible for the Communists to carry out their schemes.
I wish you to mention yet another point to your Government. When we commenced to resist Japan’s invasion, the Chinese people were informed that the war would continue for a period of 3 years. Now we have fought over 3 years but we have not vanquished Japan. No later than August of this year Chinese planes were opposing Japanese bombers but now we do not have planes adequate for this purpose. In consequence of which other Japanese bombing goes unchallenged and the people are filled with disquiet; businessmen ask how long we can prolong the conflict without Anglo-American aid. If the American airplanes cannot reach us before the severance of Indo-Chinese routes, the people’s spirit and sentiment might become so disturbed as to render the situation impossible of support.
Comment and interpretations in relation to the foregoing and allied topics follow.
Sent to the Department only.