811.20 (D) Regulations/1004
Memorandum by Mr. Howard J. Trueblood of the Office of the Adviser on International Economic Affairs79
From an examination of the underlying memoranda80 it does not appear that the basis at present exists for parallel action on the part of the United States and Great Britain for imposing restrictions on exports to Japan. Before such action could be taken it would be desirable to have much more complete information with regard to Japanese sources of supply and a far more integrated control system than that implied by the British suggestions for parallel action.
For obvious reasons the British are extremely desirous that the United States restrict exports of certain commodities to Japan including cobalt, copper, carbon black, cotton linters, graphite, and platinum. It should be observed, however, that the British Empire itself is an important if not the major supplier of tin, rubber, wool, iron ore, manganese, and even graphite, to Japan. For example, the British, while making supplies of rubber available to Japan, wish us to withhold supplies of carbon black which Japan might use to convert this rubber into truck tires for military purposes. Furthermore, the British Empire supplies iron ore and manganese to Japan but urges that the United States restrict the cobalt used to convert these materials into high grade tool steels.
The British have of course restricted the exportation of most war materials to Japan. This restriction, however, seems to be related far more to the supply situation in Great Britain than to Japanese strategic considerations. In effect this country is already doing the same thing since it is quite easy to prohibit the exportation of any material on the grounds that it is required for the exporting nation’s defense effort. Great Britain, however, wishes the United States to go beyond this point in a line which the British themselves have not followed in all cases. There is little evidence that the British have prohibited the exportation of any strategic material, with the possible exception of copper, where Empire supplies are adequate for military needs.
The foregoing is not intended to imply that cooperation with the British in reducing the supply of strategic materials to Japan is undesirable. On the contrary, our own national self-interest would make [Page 616] the restriction of strategic material exports to Japan or the Axis a desirable objective. Such action, however, should be related to that self-interest rather than relatively blind cooperation with the attendant political risks and economic dislocations. This might involve a reinterpretation of what constitutes “measures short of war” to include within the scope of the latter a comprehensive Anglo-American plan for the control of world supplies of all strategic materials. Such a plan would of necessity take into consideration the different economic structures of the United States and the British Empire and the long term interests of both countries rather than the immediate exigencies of the British war effort.
As a step towards the consideration of any such arrangement the full exchange of information between the United States and the British as to controls is desirable. In addition steps might advantageously be taken to reexamine the entire question of world supplies of essential war materials with reference to the economic and strategic position of the United States and the British Empire on the one hand and the Axis and Japan on the other. In this connection it is also essential that consideration be given to alternative sources of supply in world areas not under British or American control.
- Assistant Secretary of State Grady on November 19 added a notation as follows: “I feel that our reply to the British should indicate sympathy with the objectives and a desire to cooperate to the extent that it is practical.”↩
- Of conversations between Department and British Embassy officers, most of them not printed.↩