Office of the Historian

894.24/1128: Telegram

The First Secretary of Embassy in China (Smyth) to the Secretary of State

Peiping, October 29, 1940—1 p.m.
[Received October 30—9:28 a.m.]

408. The informant’s views are as follows:

“There is the heartiest endorsement here among Americans generally over the action of our Government in prohibiting the sale of steel and scrap iron to Japan.76 We are also encouraged by what seems to be widespread editorial and popular approval of this decision. We hope that it will be extended to other war materials, or even to complete stoppage of all imports from and exports to Japan until there is a fundamental change of policy in that country. This would mean concretely the withdrawal of all their armed forces from China and an abandonment of the southward or oceanic expansion. Should this involve us in war with Japan—as I still think is unlikely—it would be more quickly and easily over with than if allowed to drift until the inevitable and far more disastrous conflict of the future, when possibly moral aspects of our action would also be less easy to defend.

Japan has now three possible courses in response to the American attitude:

(1)
A reckless continuance of the imperialistic aggression the extent of which is now being unmistakably disclosed. This would be logical in view of their long preparation, enormous expenditure, national prestige, admiration of German technique, and racial temperament. The dominant military group would otherwise forfeit its power, and hence will only be deterred by superior force. At present the news from Tokyo is of warlike propaganda and preparation in the midst of highly emotional excitement. This spasm of resentment and of reluctance to lose the alluring benefits of conquest would be great whatever may be their ultimate decision.
(2)
A realization of the disastrous consequences to themselves in provoking American economic and possible naval opposition, with the probable co-operation of Great Britain, and the intensified Chinese resistance that would follow. This may enable the industrialists, financiers, liberals and moderates generally to curb their headstrong militarists and open the way toward a negotiated peace. In this they would nave a measure of support at least from the navy which has a much more realistic appreciation than the army of the dangers they would incur.
(3)
The most probable and most unsatisfactory course will be an apparent compliance with American demands, with fair promises and some minor concessions, thus attempting to lull our people into a comfortable belief that the crisis is over. This [Page 613] has been the consistent Japanese procedure thus far and they are skillful in such diplomatic trickery. As one who hates war as ardently as can any pacifist, whose life also and almost all that makes life desirable would be in immediate danger if either of the other courses were adopted by Japan, I fear this dilatory opportunism of illusory quieting down of American sentiment more than anything else that could happen. For it can only lead to vastly greater wretchedness for China, far heavier cost to ourselves later, and tragedy for Japan. The destruction of any or all the American life and property involved is relatively trivial in comparison with the greater gains, gains [which?] would stimulate our determination to secure a thorough going settlement and would establish on a surer basis all those American enterprises in the occupied areas of China which cannot in any case survive unless the relentless Japanese grip is for all time removed. The chief purpose in my writing again is to plead as passionately as possible that our Government and people see this through at any cost now that they have taken a definite stand regardless of plausible Japanese publicity or meretricious proposals of compromise. For these will not be and indeed cannot be genuine. Their stakes in this adventure are too heavy.”

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Chungking, Shanghai. Code text via air mail to Tokyo.

Smyth
  1. See President Roosevelt’s regulations, dated September 30, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, p. 223.↩