Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1940, The Far East, Volume IV

711.94/1465: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, April 2, 1940—9 p.m.
[Received April 2—4:25 p.m.]

227. 1. During the last several days a number of important and influential Japanese have sought off the record interviews with me, some of which have lasted for several hours. All of these talks have reflected a deep-seated and widespread anxiety over the present status and trend of American-Japanese relations, an anxiety which has been considerably enhanced by the current rumors of my impending resignation. My categorical denials published both in Washington and Tokyo have not served to allay these rumors. The anxiety arises from the public conception that I see no way out from the so-called stalemate between our two countries and have therefore become discouraged as to any favorable outcome. Those Japanese who are conversant with foreign affairs naturally assume that under whatever ostensible auspices I may return to the United States, the step will reflect the wishes of my Government. The practical effect of these rumors, if any, should be favorable rather than the reverse.

2. The public position of Japan is amply reflected in various official statements and press articles reported in my several recent telegrams, but for purpose of ready reference that position may be briefly summarized as follows:

Japan’s political policy and action in China will be governed by the principles laid down in the Konoye peace terms enunciated in December, 1938,⁹ which are not at all regarded as the extreme of moderation. The rights and interests of third powers, including those of the United States, will be fully respected and maintained by Japan. This includes observance of the principle of the Open Door although geographical proximity accords to Japan certain special economic interests upon which Japan’s national security depends. Every nation whose national security is at stake will always when possible take the necessary measures to preserve that security. These measures envisage no intention to drive American interests out of China. American cooperation in the reconstruction of China will be essential. The establishment of the Wang Ching-wei regime is expected to solve these problems. Admittedly that regime will have to depend for a period of time upon Japanese armed support but every effort will be made progressively to remove Japanese forces. It is fully expected that the Chiang Kai-shek Government will soon collapse and will throw in its lot with Wang Ching-wei. Patience on the part of third powers will bring a reasonable solution of their problems.

3. There are, however, facets to Japanese opinion which did not come to the surface but are being revealed to me in confidence by important Japanese with whom I am in close touch. In spite of the difficulty of epitomizing a series of conversations even with intelligent and comparatively articulate Japanese, I believe that I give in the following paragraph a fair presentation of their attitude which can properly be taken as representing an important cross section of intelligent thought in Japan at the present juncture.

In an extended conversation today an influential Japanese publicist,¹⁰ who has free access to army leaders as well as to important political personages, said: “I have been carefully studying Mr. Hull’s statements since the beginning of the China conflict and I have come to the conclusion that he is completely right and that Japan is entirely in the wrong.”¹¹ He went on to say that all elements which make up the Japanese body politic, including the army, when “publicly put on the spot”, consider it necessary to reflect an uncompromising attitude in respect of policies and objectives in China, but that privately each one of these elements is anxious to find a way out of the growing difficulties with the United States as well as with China. In fact, one or two of the Japanese with whom I have recently talked are so close to certain army leaders that they might quite conceivably be acting as spokesman for the latter.

4. The views which are being privately expressed to me are substantially as follows:

(a) The objective avowed during the early period of the China conflict—that of obtaining economic security by monopolies and other manifestations of a privileged position in China—is now realized as running directly counter to the only means by which peace can be assured, not only in the Far East but in the rest of the world, that is, by free access to markets and raw materials. The acquiring of the end of self-sufficiency at the cost of foreign rights and interests diplomatically will not compensate Japan for the loss of the friendship of the great commercial powers. Therefore such settlement as may be finally reached with China must be one which fully recognizes the needs and rights of those powers in China as well as of the needs and rights of both Japan and China. (By way of comment, I should add that the invariable response of these Japanese to the evidence which I have presented to them that monopolies and exclusive enterprises are being established almost every day by the Japanese in various parts of China is that these monopolies and enterprises grow out of the needs of the military situation and will be abolished as soon as the hostilities are concluded.)

(b) Any approach toward peace along the lines above suggested is blocked however by three aspects of Japanese policy; first, the declaration that Japan will no longer “deal with Chiang Kai Shek”;¹² second, the declaration that foreign powers will not he permitted to interfere in the China conflict;¹³ and third, failure by Japan to define the “new order in East Asia”. These three points are closely interrelated: no settlement from which Chiang Kai Shek and third powers are excluded can be permanent, while no response on the part of Chiang Kai Shek or the foreign powers to any Japanese peace initiative can be expected so long as Japan does not or cannot disclose its specific exceptions for cooperation with China and with third powers in respect of their individual and common rights in China.

5. I present these views merely as a piece of objective reporting and I wish to make it clear that they are well in advance of public opinion. They are, nevertheless, held currently by persons who are beyond question in a position to reflect currents of opinion in the most influential quarters. My contacts are such that I believe I shall be able to inform the Department if and when these constructive trends of thought obtain any measure of secure footing among those who are able to implement Japanese policy.

6. It is needless to state that in all of these conversations I have faithfully reflected the point of view of the American Government and people in principle and in detail.

Grew

9. See statement by the Japanese Prime Minister, December 22, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 482.
10. Tetsuma Hashimoto, leader of the Shiun-so.
11. For latest statement by the Secretary of State on the Wang Ching-wei regime, dated March 30, see Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, p. 59.
12. Statement by the Japanese Government, January 16, 1938, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 437.
13. See statement by the Japanese Foreign Office, April 17, 1934, ibid., p. 224; cf. Foreign Relations, 1934, vol. iii, pp. 112 ff.