Office of the Historian

761.9315 Manchuria/172: Telegram

The Chargé in Japan (Dooman) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, September 18, 1939—6 p.m.
[Received September 18—11:45 a.m.]

482. Department’s 287, September 15, 2 p.m.81

1.
There is no evidence available here to indicate that the conclusion of the Soviet-Japanese agreement to end the fighting in Nomonhan can be attributed in any way to German efforts to bring Japan and the Soviet Union together. The only information which I am able to obtain from official quarters is confirmatory of the statement reported in our 478, September 16, 3 p.m.,81 to the effect that the agreement was reached without any help from Germany and that there are no negotiations either in progress or in view looking toward the conclusion between Japan and the Soviet Union of a non-aggression treaty. In fact the Foreign Office today informed me that I could accept the statement made to me on September 16 as authoritative and official. The Soviet Embassy here is in charge of a young Second Secretary who is also the only commissioned officer in the Chancery and he appears to be without any information whatever.
2.
I have talked with a number of well informed and highly placed Japanese and I find no sentiment in favor of the conclusion of a non-aggression treaty with Russia. The opinion is unanimous that a non-aggression treaty in the circumstances now existing would take on the shape of an alliance, and that an alliance with the Soviet Union would be the surest way of becoming involved in the war in Europe and thus would be a fundamental departure from the basic attitude of non-involvement. The following is a syllabus of views expressed:
(a)
To assume that it is as easy for Japan to enter into special relations with Russia as it is for Germany to do so would be to reason from a false analogy. Whereas there is no substantial difference between German political thought and the political thought of the Soviet Union, Japanese policy is completely irreconcilable with communism.
(b)
There is a frontal conflict between Japan’s continental policy and the Soviet’s militant communism in China.
(c)
Recent events, such as Soviet betrayal of the military agreement with France and of the non-aggression treaty with Poland,82 show conclusively that Russia cannot be trusted. A non-aggression treaty with Russia would be useful to Japan at this time if it could enable Japan to divert to China its large forces in Manchuria, but the lack of confidence in Russian good faith would prevent Japan from placing any reliance on any such treaty.
3.
The information reported in the Department’s telegram under reference to be in the possession of the British Government with regard to the desire of the Japanese Army in China to provoke a conflict with Great Britain and France and to reach an agreement with Germany and Russia is to say the least at variance with predominant thought in Japan. It has been stressed here repeatedly by leading Japanese from the Prime Minister down that the need for settling the conflict with China is the paramount consideration of Japanese policy. The prospects of bringing the conflict with China to an end either by the setting up of a new government under Wang Ching Wei83 or by direct negotiation with Chungking are being viewed here with an optimism which I believe our representatives in China would regard as unwarranted. However, a few days ago I had a talk with a highly placed Japanese84 who conferred with Wang Ching Wei during the latter’s recent visit to Japan. I was informed that the purpose of Wang’s visit to Japan was to urge upon the Japanese Government relaxation of Japanese pressure on the position in China of Great Britain. It may be possible that Wang has put himself forward to the British as an intermediary with the Japanese. In a draft telegram of the British Embassy here which was shown to me this morning responsive to a telegram from London the British Ambassador has agreed to recommend to the British Government the advisability of offering at this time to the Japanese to withdraw the British troops from Tientsin. These are but straws in the wind, but it seems too early to assume that the Japanese Army in China has abandoned hope of obtaining concessions from the British in respect [of Britain]’s position in China either by pressure or by blandishments.
4.
The fact is not overlooked that present urgent practical considerations on the part of both Japan and Russia make desirable peaceful relations between the two countries: Russia has begun active participation in the hostilities in Europe, while Japan, involved in China, is determined to devote all efforts toward a satisfactory conclusion [Page 73] of the China incident. It may be that these exigencies which undoubtedly bring out in both Japan and Russia a strong desire to avoid at this time involvement of one with the other lend color to the suggestions that significant political arrangements between the two countries are in the offing. It is my view that the cardinal points of Japanese policy are (a) speedy settlement of the conflict with China; (b) non-involvement in the European war; and (c) no new commitments. An expression of my belief that no sensational political agreement is likely between Japan and the Soviet Union or with Germany will, I hope, be more useful to the Department than an equivocal estimate calculated to meet any vicissitudes of present day diplomacy.

Summary to Shanghai for repetition to Chungking and Peiping.

Dooman
  1. Not printed.↩
  2. Not printed.↩
  3. Dated July 25, 1932, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cxxxvi, p. 41.↩
  4. Formerly Deputy Leader of the Kuomintang, at this time in Japanese-occupied China.↩
  5. Prince Konoye, according to telegram No. 483, September 18, 8 p.m., from the Chargé in Japan (761.9315 Manchuria/173).↩