Office of the Historian

500.A15A5/43: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, May 3, 1934—11 a.m.
[Received May 3—1:30 a.m.]

88. In an informal conversation last evening with the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs32 at a dinner at his residence he said to me that he had been puzzling as to the best way to prepare the ground for the coming Naval Conference so that it will be successful. It seemed to him, he said, important to reduce the problems of the Conference to their simplest possible elements because its success will depend much upon its simplicity. The United States and Japan, he thought, could accept as axiomatic the hypothesis that the Navy of neither country will ever attack the territory or possession of the other. With this principle as a basis he thought that it would not be difficult to arrive at some mutually satisfactory limitation in ships which would result in real reduction. What Japan most feared, however, was that she might run into the same sort of situation which she had encountered last year in Geneva in facing a solid block of opponents resulting in her withdrawal from the League of Nations.33 The Japanese people, he said, were now doubly fearful of international institutions and conferences. He developed this thought at considerable length but he added that they (the Foreign Office) were still “puzzling” and had [Page 234] formulated no plans although determined that the Naval Conference must be made successful. He seemed to be inviting suggestions from me and he asked how I thought the matter should be approached. I replied that I had no authorization to approach the subject but referred to your message to Hirota34 to the effect that you would be glad to receive suggestions from the Minister for Foreign Affairs either through the Japanese Ambassador in Washington or the American Ambassador in Tokyo which might tend to increase our friendly relations.

I have the impression that this was an initial feeler probably put out at Hirota’s suggestion. Unless otherwise instructed I shall continue to take the position stated above, that of declining to be drawn into a discussion of plans or principles but reporting whatever may be said to me.

Incidentally the Vice Minister spoke in very favorable terms of the substance and tone of your aide-mémoire of April 29th.35

Grew
  1. Mamoru Shigemitsu.↩
  2. See Foreign Relations, 1933, vol. i, pp. 16–34 passim.↩
  3. Informal and personal message of March 3, 1934, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 128.↩
  4. Ibid., p. 231.↩