Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1933, The Far East, Volume III

761.94/633

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

No. 536

Tokyo, September 29, 1933.
[Received October 13.]

Sir: Adverting to my telegram No. 127 of July 18, noon, and to recent despatches^* relating to Soviet-Japanese relations, there is submitted below a further report covering recent incidents and developments touching upon this general subject. While the situation between the two countries does not at the present moment appear to be critical, foreign observers in Tokyo are very nearly unanimous that, with a continuance of present political conditions, eventual war between Japan and Soviet Russia is inevitable, such differences of opinion as arise being concerned more with the probable time of the eventual clash than with the inevitability of its occurrence. The majority of observers set the spring of 1935 or the spring of 1936 as the most likely dates, basing their opinion on the fact that Japan will then be fully prepared to strike, but it is obviously recognized that unforeseen developments may alter these predictions.

The foregoing opinions are based to some extent on the following factors:

(1) The Chinese Eastern Railway controversy.

(2) The continuance of petty but irritating incidents.

(3) Japanese ambitions in Kamchatka and Mongolia.

(4) Soviet military preparations and increasing indications of Russian intransigence.

1. Chinese Eastern Railway Controversy.^†

On September 21 the Gaimusho³⁷ received a protest from the Soviet Government which denounced in harsh terms the Japanese “Manchukuo” stand in the Chinese Eastern Railway Sale Controversy and served warning that Soviet Russia would hold the Japanese Government directly responsible should the reported plan to seize the railway be consummated. With this protest the question was transformed from a purely business deal between “Manchukuo” and Soviet Russia to a first class diplomatic issue involving Japan. The Foreign Office, however, preserving the fiction that Japan is not concerned in the matter, has referred the protest to “Manchukuo”. With the reported seizure of Pogranitchnaya and Manchuli stations, east and west termini of the Chinese Eastern Railway, the situation contains dangerous potentialities.

2. The Continuance of petty but irritating incidents.

The number of border clashes and “incidents” involving Japan, “Manchukuo” and Soviet Russia has not diminished. These include the attack on a Chinese Eastern Railway train near Pogranitchnaya and capture of 37 Soviet citizens by alleged “Manchukuo” agents on September 10; the detention and release six days later of a Mr. Kameyama, “Manchukuo” revenue officer, suspected of espionage by the Soviet border guards; the accusation that the river steamer Tungshan carries hidden Soviet guards; the seizure of two Soviet sailing vessels near Anbetsu, West Saghalien; and the detention by Soviet employees of the Chinese Eastern Railway of a train bound from Pogranitchnaya to Harbin on September 25 and its release as a result of a “strong” protest by “Manchukuo” officials. While the above incidents are petty in character, they nevertheless serve to intensify the friction along the border where military outposts are remote from the control of the central command. Bearing in mind the psychology of the younger army officers in Japan, their arrogance and impetuosity, there is an ever present possibility that an insignificant clash may result in serious consequences. Reports frequently reach Tokyo that White Russians in Manchuria are constantly intriguing to that end.

3. Japanese ambitions in Kamchatka and Mongolia.

It has become increasingly evident that the important issues between Soviet Russia and Japan are not limited to the liquidation of the Russian sphere of interest in North Manchuria and the settlement of the Chinese Eastern Railway controversy. North Saghalien, the Amur district, the Maritime Provinces, Kamchatka, and Mongolia are frequently mentioned within the scope of Japanese ambitions. The stake is oil, coal, fisheries, lumber, mineral ores, and, in the case of Mongolia, wealthy markets.

In regard to fisheries there is indication that Japan proposes to take an aggressive attitude in furthering her interests in the neighborhood of Kamchatka. Recently it was announced in the press that a conference to settle all the pending problems of this industry will be held at Hakodate, Hokkaido, beginning October 7. The Government will be represented by officials of the Foreign Office, and of the Navy, Communications and Agriculture and Forestry Ministries. The decision of the conference, it is said, will be transmitted to the Soviet Government by the Foreign Office, and owing to the dissatisfaction of the Japanese fishing interests with the present conduct of the fisheries, will certainly include demands directly opposed to the interests of the Soviets. Incidentally the Soviet-Japanese Fishery Convention expires in 1936.

It is also to be noted that the Japanese are actively attempting to dominate Mongolia. As reported in my despatch No. 526 of September 25, 1933,³⁸ the General Manager of the National City Bank for Japan and Manchuria³⁹ told me that he had learned, while in North Manchuria, that hundreds of Japanese secret agents are at work seeking to win the favor of the Mongolians. There are in Tokyo not infrequent rumors of the success which has attended efforts to bribe the Mongol princes. The economic possibilities of Mongolia are frequently underestimated, and it is evident that the conflict of interests in a region which Soviet Russia had successfully appropriated to herself will be a bitter one. Behind Mongolia, moreover, lies a new industrial region vital to the Soviets.

4. Soviet military preparations and increasing indications of Russian intransigeance.

On August 29 in Tokyo at a dinner which he was giving to representatives of the Foreign Press the Soviet Ambassador did some very plain speaking. He denounced the Japanese defense propaganda in no uncertain terms, stated that Soviet Russia was at the limit of its patience in dealing with Japan, and declared that not only was his country well prepared to defend its territory if need be but was ready and able to conduct offensive operations. To support this evidence that Russia at last feels able to play a stronger hand is the statement of a Soviet Trade representative who declared that a year ago Soviet Russia would have evacuated the Maritime Provinces but that now she would be prepared for any eventuality by 1935. Furthermore, Russia does not hesitate to retaliate in the give and take of the “Manchukuo” border incidents nor does the uncompromising attitude of the Soviet delegates to the Chinese Eastern Railway sale conference in Tokyo suggest the former defensive attitude of the Soviet Government.

Behind this note of defiance struck by Soviet officials lies the consciousness of growing military strength along the Amur river and in the neighborhood of Vladivostok, a development which has contributed greatly to the conviction that a Soviet-Japanese war can scarcely be avoided. Three hundred bombing planes of the latest types are said to be concentrated at Vladivostok and the realization that it is within the range of these planes to wreak havoc in the wooden cities of Japan is proving disquieting to the Japanese military.^‡ The airbase, moreover, commands the new rail route to “Manchukuo” from the port of Rashin, Chosen, through Tunhua. The Kwantung army is informed that, while the Soviets do not have as many men in Siberia as most people believe (number variously estimated at from 150,000 to 600,000) their equipment, tanks, airplanes, machine guns, etc., are of the most modern type and quite complete. It is not always realized that the major part of this military strength has developed from the feverish preparations of the last year and that the contrast between the strategic situation now and a year ago is very marked.

Nevertheless, despite the foregoing factors which have convinced observers of the ultimate likelihood of war, it is not generally believed that such a war could eventuate before 1935. The 6th division has recently been recalled from Manchuria, a member of the Foreign Office section which handles Russian Affairs informed one of my staff that the Kwantung Army is not ready to fight and does not wish trouble at the present time, and the appointment of Mr. Koki Hirota (former Ambassador to Moscow) as Foreign Minister is frequently interpreted as indicative of a wish to tide over Russo-Japanese problems for several years. It may be said, however, that the hypothesis has been advanced that Japan, as a result of her comprehensive information concerning conditions in Soviet Russia, believes that the Stalin regime may not maintain its grip much longer and that the subsequent deterioration of the U.S.S.R. would enable her to realize her ambitions without the cost of a war. Such a belief would explain the confident contempt in which many sections of opinion hold Soviet Russia.

Perhaps the most important evidence that war is not an imminent possibility lies in the indifference of the public. Patriotic fervor has been kept at high pitch by the military propagandists since September 18, 1931 and it is notable that Soviet Russia has seldom been accredited by them the menace to national security. It is scarcely conceivable that public opinion would not now be mobilized against Russia if war were near. In fact the only recent evidence of public feeling on the subject is an attack on the offices of Mr. Kojiro Matsu-kata, agent for the alleged dumping of Soviet gasoline on the local market, and this may well have been instigated by his commercial rivals.

In conclusion therefore, it appears reasonable to believe that for the present Japan will devote her energies to the exploitation of Manchuria, to the North China situation, to the modernization of her army and the building of her navy, and to her manifold trade problems, although, it may be said, the possibility certainly exists that a crisis may result from the Chinese Eastern Railway situation. For the future only time will tell whether a war will fulfill the logic of the evidence or whether unforeseen forces will obviate a struggle generally predicted for two years hence.

Respectfully yours,

Joseph C. Grew

1. Embassy’s despatch[es] No. 472 of July 13, 1933 and No. 483 of July 28, 1933. [Footnote in the original; despatches not printed.]
2. Embassy’s despatch [es] No. 535, September 29, 1933 and No. 471 of July 13, 1933. [Footnote in the original; despatches not printed.]
37. Japanese Foreign Office.
38. Not printed.
39. John L. Curtis.
40. See enclosure, leading article Tokyo Jiji, September 29, 1933. [Footnote in the original; enclosure not printed.]