893.01 Manchuria/916
Memorandum by the Vice Consul at Mukden (Hall)51
The strictly confidential information submitted in this memorandum was obtained from a reliable Japanese official who is in a position to be thoroughly informed on the subject.
Immediately after the “Manchurian Incident” of September 18, 1931 Colonels Itagaki and Ishihara were very much concerned because the Japanese Consulate General at Mukden would not support the policy of the Kwantung Army. Colonels Itagaki and Ishihara were, of course, the real power behind Lieutenant-General Honjo52 who was merely a puppet. The policy of the Kwantung Army was the one which in general has actually been carried out in Manchuria. On the other hand, as is well known, the policy of the local Japanese Consulate General, in accordance with that of the Foreign Office, the Kwantung Government, and the War Minister, General Minami (Minseito), was to confine military action to the occupation of Mukden; and then with Mukden occupied to negotiate with Chang Hsueh-liang for the settlement of outstanding Manchurian questions. In that way Japan could have obtained everything it wanted. The War Minister instructed the Kwantung Army to follow this policy but his order was not observed.
A few days after September 18th Major Hanaya, “a simple-minded man” and a subordinate of Itagaki and Ishihara on the staff of the Kwantung Army, becoming incensed at the refusal of the Japanese Consulate General to concur with the policy of the Army, called on Consul Morishima53 (now Consul General at Harbin) who was the most active member of Consul-General Hayashi’s54 staff. During the interview the Major lost control because he could not win Mr. Morishima over to the Kwantung Army’s policy, and drew his sword with the intention of attacking Mr. Morishima. The latter pushed an alarm button and ten consular police rushed in and prevented the infuriated Major from carrying out his plan.
In reply to my expression of surprise at his statement, that the Kwantung Army did not heed the orders of the Minister of War, my informant replied that the Kwantung Army considered itself responsible only to the Emperor. He added, as an example, that the Kwantung Army was so completely out of Government control that it was necessary to issue an Imperial Ordinance to stop the first drive on Chinchow, and that it did not take long for the Army to obtain permission for the second drive.
[Page 343]In conclusion my informant stated that liberal Japanese consider it a good thing that the Army was not checked in Manchuria by the Government. He believes that if the Army had submitted to Government control on the Manchurian question, the “Young Officers” group would have become sufficiently incensed to start a revolution in Japan.