Office of the Historian

894.00/467: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, February 23, 1933—1 p.m.
[Received February 23—7:42 a.m.]

45. In any estimate of the situation in the Far East the following elements should be given consideration.

1.
By the decision of the Cabinet to secede from the League of Nations Japan has prepared to burn her most important bridge with the outside world. This step indicates the complete supremacy of the military and a fundamental defeat for the moderate elements in the country. Every important step by the League of Nations has been forestalled or succeeded by a fait accompli here in order to demonstrate Japan’s independence of and disregard for Western interference with what she conceives to be her own vital interests. There is no bluff in her attitude. The military themselves, and the public through military propaganda, are fully prepared to fight rather than to surrender to moral or other pressure from the West. The moral obloquy of the rest of the world at present serves only to strengthen not to modify their determination. Any tendency on the part of the Government to compromise would almost certainly result in further assassinations if not in internal revolution.
2.
In this national temper the following elements play their part:
(a)
The desire of the military to maintain prestige and their determination to brook no interference whatever;
(b)
The essential importance of saving face which permits no backward step;
(c)
The carefully nurtured belief that Manchuria is the “life line” of Japan;
(d)
Long strained exasperation with the former chaotic conditions in Manchuria and the failure of the Chinese to fulfill their treaty obligations;
(e)
The total disregard by the military of future financial difficulties arising out of the huge expenses of the Manchurian campaign;
(f)
The basic inability of the Japanese to comprehend the sanctity of contractual obligations when opposed to their own Far East interests.
3.
With regard to the drive into Jehol, it is believed that special measures have been taken to avoid going south of the Great Wall even although this decision may render the campaign considerably most [more?] difficult and costly. Nevertheless, it would be unwise to disregard the possibility that unforeseen developments or incidents may in future lead to the taking of the Peiping-Tientsin line. If the League of Nations should apply active sanctions Japan’s reply would very likely be to occupy North China. This, of course, would bring foreign interests into direct conflict with Japan and constitutes the greatest future potential danger.
4.
Finally, it may be said that a large section of the public and the Army has been led by military propaganda to believe that eventual war between the United States and Japan or Russia and Japan or both is inevitable. The military and naval machines are in a state of high efficiency and are rapidly being strengthened. They possess complete self-confidence and arrogance. The Navy is becoming more bellicose. In the present temper of the Army and Navy and the public there is always the risk that any serious incident tending to inflame public opinion might lead Japan to radical steps without counting the cost thereof. In this respect conditions are still precisely as set forth in my 224, September 3, noon.13
5.
The foregoing brief summary represents the opinion of all the principal members of my staff as well as of most of my diplomatic colleagues and other foreigners here.
6.
Strict press bans are in force preventing the publication of any information concerning the present operations in Jehol so that the Embassy is in the dark concerning military developments.

Repeated to Peiping.

Grew
  1. Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 102.↩