711.94/23441/25
Memorandum of a Conversation
The Japanese Ambassador called at his request at the Secretary’s apartment and introduced Mr. Obata89 who, he said, was educated in America and whose knowledge of English might enable Mr. Obata to help the Ambassador in making sure that the Ambassador understood clearly what the Secretary said.
The Ambassador first expressed the hope that an early reply might be given to the message from Prince Konoye which the Ambassador had delivered to the President on August 28. The Secretary replied that the President expected to be back in Washington on the following day and the Secretary would talk with the President again about the matter.
The Secretary then reviewed briefly what he had said to the Japanese Ambassador on the evening of August 28 and the Ambassador, in reply to the Secretary’s inquiry, stated that he had telegraphed a report to his Government of what the Secretary had said.
The Secretary said that he had been endeavoring to feel out the situation with respect to China in an attempt to inform himself as to how the Chinese might react toward the question of a settlement with Japan and he pointed out that, notwithstanding the feeling expressed by the Ambassador that the Japanese did not expect difficulties with the Chinese Government in reaching a settlement, the [Page 584] Chinese were in fact far from receptive to the idea of such a settlement. The Ambassador said he felt that the only reason that the Chinese were adopting such an attitude was because of the assistance that the United States was rendering China and that if the United States should discontinue that assistance the Chinese would no longer set themselves against Japan. The Secretary pointed out that it would not make for a stabilized peace in the Far East if the Chinese should become embittered and that the Secretary was impressed with the need of retaining the good-will of China in order that this Government might be of maximum assistance in contributing to a settlement which would result in reconciliation between Japan and China.
Mr. Obata referred to the three fundamental points upon which difficulties had been encountered in reconciling our respective views during the course of the conversations which had been held last spring. He said that while some of the younger officers might hold out on the question of retention of Japanese troops in North China and Inner Mongolia for defense against communism, he thought that agreement on this point and on the other two points, namely the question of the application to Japan’s proposed economic cooperation with China of the principle of non-discrimination in international relations and the question of Japan’s obligations under the Tripartite Pact as they affected our program of self-defense, could easily be adjusted when the meeting took place between the heads of our respective Governments. The Secretary asked what would happen if such an agreement was not reached and repeated his suggestion that we endeavor to reach an agreement in principle on fundamental questions before the meeting should take place.
The Japanese Ambassador then emphasized the urgent need of making provision for a peaceful settlement in the Pacific area which, he pointed out, was just as much for the interest of the United States as of Japan.
Mr. Obata raised the question of publicity in regard to the proposed meeting between the heads of our respective Governments, and observed that Prince Konoe could not absent himself from Tokyo without exciting public comment. He suggested that the two Governments might consider making a public announcement about the proposed meeting at an early date. The Secretary replied that this was a point to which we should give appropriate attention.
The Ambassador then mentioned that he had been criticized by his Government for having told the press of his having delivered a message to the President from Prince Konoe, and added that nevertheless the press reaction in Japan had been favorable, which indicated that public opinion in Japan would support a rapprochement between Japan and the United States.
[Page 585]The Secretary said he was glad to hear this, as press despatches from Tokyo which have been appearing in the press in this country and reporting statements by Japanese spokesmen and publicists emphasizing Japan’s determination to establish for itself a so-called co-prosperity sphere in the Far East and a special economic and political position for herself had prompted many people to make inquiry of him as to whether there was any way in which what Japan demanded could be reconciled with the position of the United States. He said that these expressions of Japan’s objectives and the constant agitation in the Japanese press against the United States created a source of difficulty to this Government in connection with the proposal of a meeting such as the Japanese Government proposed. The Secretary noted that just as the Japanese Government had to reckon with the Japanese public opinion, this Government had to reckon with public opinion in this country and he added that the Japanese press campaign was not only making it difficult to deal with American public opinion but it would also militate against our bringing China, Great Britain and the Dutch East Indies into line with a plan for the establishment of a general program of peace in the Pacific area.
The Secretary pointed out that, if the Japanese Government now found it difficult to influence the Japanese public and press against agitation in favor of a policy of conquest by force and against conducting a campaign prejudicial to the success of a peaceful settlement with the United States, there was no assurance that the Japanese Government could obtain public support for any such settlement after it had been concluded, and then there might occur in Japan some new political crisis. The Secretary therefore suggested that it would be a part of wisdom for the Japanese Government to exercise its influence with the Japanese press and to point out the benefits that would flow to Japan from a peaceful program such as the Secretary and the Japanese Ambassador had had in mind. The Secretary asked the Ambassador whether he could not urge upon his Government immediate efforts in this direction. The Secretary pointed out that the Japanese Government would have nothing to lose by such a course, even though no agreement with the United States was reached as the Japanese Government would have to its credit efforts to proceed along a peaceful course. The Ambassador said that he would communicate the Secretary’s suggestion to his Government.
- Mr. Shigeyoshi Obata.↩