711.94/2624
Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)
The Director of the American Bureau telephoned me this afternoon shortly before three o’clock to tell me that although the Foreign Minister had asked me to call upon him at three o’clock this afternoon, in view of a recent development the Minister was afraid of attendant publicity should I visit him and had requested Mr. Terasaki to deliver to me the Foreign Minister’s message on his behalf. [Page 580] Mr. Terasaki accordingly called at the Embassy and on behalf of the Minister conveyed to me for my information the text of the communication from the Japanese Prime Minister to the President which had been delivered by Admiral Nomura in Washington on August 28.
Mr. Terasaki’s visit was substituted for my call on the Foreign Minister because the Japanese press had learned from Washington that a message from the Japanese Prime Minister had been delivered to the President and the news had reached Japan in such a form that it was impossible for the Government to conceal the fact of such a message from the Japanese public and as a result the Japanese Government felt compelled to issue the statement cabled in my telegram no. 1342, August 29, 4 p.m.
Mr. Terasaki, speaking on behalf of the Foreign Minister, dwelt on the unfortunate effect of the publicity which had been given to this matter in Washington since, although the reports had not disclosed the contents of the Prime Minister’s message to the President, they did reveal to the Japanese public and to the pro-Axis and extremist elements that Prince Konoye had taken the initiative in what was obviously a conciliatory move at a time when indignation was high in Japan as a result of the progressive steps recently taken by the American Government which included the initial order freezing Japanese assets in the United States, the announcement that American tankers bearing oil to the Soviet Union had departed from Californian ports, and the decision to send a military mission headed by General Magruder to Chiang Kai-shek.87 Mr. Terasaki pointed out that the publicity given to the Prime Minister’s message is consequently of direct advantage to the extremist and pro-Axis elements in this country and has not only rendered further moves in the direction of conciliation very difficult but has in addition immeasurably augmented the possibility of an attempt on the life of Prince Konoye. He added that the Chief of Police this afternoon had indicated the increased risk to the Prime Minister’s life.
The Director of the American Bureau conveyed to me from Admiral Toyoda an appeal for transmission to my Government to take the following three steps without which the Foreign Minister feared that Prince Konoye would meet with serious obstacles in his efforts to bring about an understanding between the United States and Japan:
- (1)
- The meeting between the two responsible heads of the American and Japanese Governments should take place without delay. Delay would afford those elements who oppose any attempt to conciliate the United States an opportunity to organize their adherents and to spread the idea to the Japanese public that Prince Konoye is yielding [Page 581] to American pressure and, in seeking to reach an understanding with the United States in the teeth of what is publicly regarded as American provocative measures, is exposing Japan to humiliation.
- (2)
- The United States Government should postpone the sending of tankers to the Soviet Union at least pending the outcome of the proposed meeting between the President and the Japanese Prime Minister. Mr. Terasaki told me that the Foreign Minister felt that the dangerous temper of public opinion on the question of the tankers could not be exaggerated. He added in this connection that according to information reaching Japanese authorities five American tankers destined for Vladivostok have already passed through Tsugaru or Soya Straits.
- (3)
- The American Government, pending the proposed meeting between the heads of the two Governments, should suspend the order freezing Japanese assets in the United States.
Mr. Terasaki, again speaking for the Minister, emphasized to me that the Japanese Government has dealt in complete frankness with the American Government and has assured us that upon the settlement of the China Incident Japanese troops at present in French Indochina would be withdrawn; that the Japanese troops in Indochina would make no further move in that area; and that Japan would observe the treaty of neutrality with the Soviet Union so long as that country adhered equally to the letter and spirit of the treaty. He explained that these were the maximum assurances and commitments which the Japanese Government was in a position to assume at the present time. Since the Japanese Government has gone the limit in giving these assurances, the Foreign Minister believes that the American Government for its part should make a maximum effort, along the lines of the three points outlined above, in order to assist the Prime Minister in the course which he is pursuing, a course which is now fraught with extreme difficulties and dangers as a result of the Washington publicity. Mr. Terasaki told me that the Foreign Minister was appealing to me in an endeavor to have the situation confronting the Prime Minister fully explained to the President and the Secretary and to request that the United States Government approach the suggested concessions not from a legalistic but from a psychological point of view. When Mr. Terasaki concluded the foregoing outline I acquainted him first of all with the substance of the first section of the Department’s telegram no. 544, August 28, 6 p.m.,88 which had just been received, setting forth the Secretary’s views upon the objections raised by the Japanese Government to the shipment of oil to the Soviet Union and I took occasion to emphasize the logical and compelling force of the position adopted by the Secretary on this matter. In order that there might be no misunderstanding in regard to the accuracy of the Japanese Ambassador’s reports of his recent conversations [Page 582] in Washington, I communicated orally to Mr. Terasaki the substance of the Department’s telegrams reporting these conversations.
In touching on the question of the reciprocal freezing regulations now in force I emphasized once more to Mr. Terasaki the disparity between the very liberal administration of the freezing regulations in the United States in respect to Japanese nationals and the exacting and harsh treatment meted out to American citizens and interests in Japan. Mr. Terasaki in reply merely reiterated that the Foreign Minister’s request had been that such questions be dealt with from the point of view of their psychological effect in Japan since at this period of intense crisis in relations between our two countries the psychological effect was an especially strong one. I then drew Mr. Terasaki’s attention to the mounting anti-American attitude of the Japanese press, to which Mr. Terasaki replied that he could tell me in strictest confidence that certain members of the Cabinet Information Board which was charged with matters relating to publicity are distinctly pro-Axis in their sentiments and that the Japanese Government is encountering real difficulties in handling this question.
In discussing with Mr. Terasaki the three points outlined above raised by the Foreign Minister, I left him under no illusion that the United States Government would find it possible to agree to either of the preposterous requests contained in points (2) or (3) above.