711.94/2211
Memorandum by the Secretary of State
The Japanese Ambassador called at his request. He proceeded rather earnestly to thank me for the meeting between him and the President and myself on last Sunday and for the things that were said and done on that occasion as they related to American and Japanese relations. He then said that his Government was considering the communications that were given him by the President and myself to send to his Government; that his Government could not proceed rapidly with the consideration of such matters, and that it would [Page 566] require some days yet for it to make its decisions. He then proceeded to say that in his opinion his Government was very desirous of keeping war out of the Pacific and that, of course, he himself was using his best efforts to that end, and that, therefore, he felt that ways could be found, as they should be, to bring about this peaceful situation.
I expressed my interest in and appreciation of what the Ambassador had said. I then reiterated with emphasis the main points in the position of the United States at present and heretofore in support of peace in the Pacific area and said that this Government has nothing new to say or do except to pursue its present course of proclaiming the basic principles of peace and law and justice and equality and fair play alike in the entire Pacific area, to say nothing of the world as a whole, whereas Japan having pursued a different course during recent years is in a situation where she must change vital phases of that course if she really seeks a peaceful settlement in the Pacific such as the Ambassador himself and I personally favor. I said that during the several months of conversation between the Ambassador and myself last Spring and up into June and July the Government controlled press of Japan was fairly shouting the bitterest denunciations against the United States and in favor of going forward with all sorts of so-called “new orders” and “greater new orders” in the Pacific area, while the war element, seemingly led by Matsuoka, were almost shouting their heads off about the Tripartite Agreement, against the United States, and in favor of going forward with force on a program of unlimited expansion to establish the so-called “new order”. I then added that, of course, during those months I could not induce Americans or the English or the Chinese to believe that the Government of Japan was really in earnest about discussing and bringing about a peaceful settlement in the Pacific area and that the President and I have constantly kept the Ambassador and the Japanese Government reminded of this situation, as we did as late as our conversation with the Ambassador on last Sunday and in the message sent to the Government of Japan on that day. I stated that I hoped to keep his Government continuously reminded of this phase, as well as others that have been brought up in writing, if his Government seriously seeks to make a real contribution to a peaceful settlement.
The Ambassador said that while it had not become a diplomatic incident thus far, the shipment of oil to Vladivostok through Japanese waters would naturally give the Japanese real concern at an early date; that they are faced with large Russian forces in the Vladivostok area and that they cannot be satisfied or content to see what they would firmly believe would be a great building up of Russian military supply bases just across the line from Japan and that, [Page 567] naturally, it would call for discussion in all probability. I remarked jocularly that I wondered whether the stationing of large armies by Japan and Russia facing each other across the border in the Vladi-vostok-“Manchukuoan” area was a method of administering and maintaining the late non-aggression pact entered into between Japan and Russia with great enthusiasm on the part of Matsuoka. The Ambassador only laughed but did so rather significantly. I then said that, of course, this Government at this time is only concerned to see Russia get these and other military supplies in European Russia for the purpose of resisting the German Armies; that this Government has no other motive or purpose than that, and hence the question of building up supplies for the Russian Army in the Far East is not in any sense in view. I stated that this Government is convinced that Hitler is strenuously endeavoring to conquer and destroy everything worthwhile in the Western world, and that we are determined to aid every country—to the fullest extent and as quickly as possible—that is resisting Hitler and that relates to the present situation. I said the Ambassador must be aware of the sincerity of our position and our purpose and that we consider it a compelling one. The Ambassador nodded his head as though he acquiesced at least in our sincerity and our objective whether he agreed with it or not.
I said to the Ambassador that, of course, if Japan, which I hoped she would not do, should project herself militarily into the Russian-German situation or into other military situations that would directly affect this Government, an entirely different question would be presented. I then inquired whether the Ambassador had spoken to the Russian Ambassador here on the subject and he replied in the affirmative but seemed to have gotten no particular satisfaction either way out of the conversation.
The Ambassador then said that he supposed we had abandoned the sale of any oil at all to Japan under the freezing system which requires licenses and thus far no licenses have been issued for the sale of oil. I replied that I had not checked fully on the details of this matter; that it ramifies through other departments of the Government. I then stopped long enough to inquire if the Ambassador knew what was taking place between Great Britain and Japan in this respect and he said he did not. I replied that I did not either, but that I would soon check this and our own situation as it related to his inquiry.
The Ambassador then departed, again emphasizing his hope for better relations between the two countries.