Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/21
HD–21
Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Friday, 1 August, 1919, at 3:30 p.m.
- Present
- America, United States of
- Hon. H. White.
- Hon. F. L. Polk.
- Secretary
- Mr. L. Harrison.
- British Empire
- The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.
- Secretaries
- Mr. H. Norman.
- Sir Ian Malcolm.
- France
- M. Clemenceau.
- M. Pichon.
- Secretaries
- M. Dutasta.
- M. Berthelot.
- M. de St. Quentin.
- Italy
- M. Tittoni.
- Secretary
- M. Paterno.
- Japan
- M. Matsui.
- Secretary
- M. Kawai.
- America, United States of
Joint Secretariat | |
America, United States of | Capt. Chapin. |
British Empire | Lt. Commander Bell. |
France | Capt. A. Portier. |
Italy | Lt.-Col. A. Jones. |
Interpreter—Prof. P. J. Mantoux. |
Marshal Foch and the Military Representatives entered the room.
1. M. Clemenceau stated that he had received a communication from Berlin through General Nudant1 (See Appendix “A”). It was to the effect that the German Government, as a result of the revelations made by Herr Erzberger,2 had been violently attacked from the Conservative and Independent Socialist Sections. The question most at issue was the surrender of the military officers demanded by the Treaty. Herr Erzberger asked that the provisions to that effect might not immediately be put into force.
Communication From the German Government on the Subject of the Subject of the Surrender of officers Guilty of the Laws of War
M. Tittoni said that as the Allies had representatives in Germany, it would be best to ask their advice.
M. Clemenceau said that at the present moment the situation was not quite clear. The list of German Officers guilty of breaches of [Page 450] the laws of war comprised over 1,000 persons, of whom some were Princes of the Blood. He believed that the list of Naval Officers who were to be surrendered was not yet ready.
Mr. Balfour replied that the list made out in Great Britain was ready.
M. Clemenceau remarked that the Council must be dear as to the demands that it was going to make. It was dangerous to postpone executing the provisions relating to the surrender of German Officers, if, at the same time, German prisoners were to be repatriated. M. Larnaude3 had made a report on the question of German Prisoners, and had pointed out that the problem of their repatriation was intimately connected with the surrender of enemy officers guilty of breaches of the laws of war. Mr. Lloyd George and President Wilson had themselves recognised, that the two questions emphasised in M. Larnaude’s report should be considered together. He thought that it would be improper to return German prisoners if the Germans did not themselves surrender the guilty officers. He proposed that no reply should be given at once. Herr Erzberger’s telegram might certainly be based on fact, but, on the other hand it might be intended to promote a hasty decision on the part of the Council. He asked whether the matter might not be referred to a Committee of experts.
Mr. Balfour said that it was evidently the President’s opinion that an answer should not at once be given. At the same time, the Treaty did not, in itself, permit the return of German Prisoners to be much postponed, and, by its very provisions, prevented the Allies from making a delay in their repatriation a political weapon. If the detention of the prisoners was decided upon, it must be put into force before the Treaty received general ratification.
M. Clemenceau stated, in reply to Mr. Balfour’s question that the French ratification of the Treaty would probably take place in the first week in September. He suggested that Marshal Foch, who had agents in Germany, should make a report on the subject, and that he should be given the assistance of jurisconsults.
Mr. Balfour stated that the British agents in Germany would be asked for information, and he supposed that the question to be put to the jurists would be, whether we should be justified in adopting a measure for the detention of German prisoners if the Germans refused to surrender the culpable officers.
M. Clemenceau then said that that was not quite his meaning. He wished to point out that the Germans in their note were asking for a definite favour—the waiving of the stipulations with regard to the surrender of guilty officers. The Allies, if they granted this, might ask for certain military measures to be carried out on the [Page 451] part of Germany, to compensate them for granting the German demand.
M. Tittoni pointed out that the Germans did not quite put forward their request as a favour, but were suggesting certain measures to us, on account of the social and political situation in Germany, which menaced the Allies’ interests as well as theirs. In these circumstances, would it not be advantageous to obtain further information, and come to a decision when it had been tendered.
M. Clemenceau returned to his original proposal of referring the question to a Committee of jurisconsults and military men.
Mr. Balfour then remarked that such a Committee might say “You have a right to take what measures of security you please”. He asked what Marshal Foch thought.
Marshal Foch replied that the surrender of guilty officers was not a military question, but a political one.
M. Clemenceau agreed with Marshal Foch, and said that he would like his opinion as to a suitable military compensation for the favour which would be granted to the Germans by acceding to their request.
Mr. Balfour asked whether we should not be asking the military men to verify political facts.
M. Clemenceau said that he did not think so, since military men would only be advising on the subject of military compensation.
Mr. Balfour said that it would be necessary, therefore, to ask our diplomatic representatives for information. In the meantime, the Military Representatives at Versailles should endeavour to find out whether the statements in the German communication were correct, and should further advise the Council as to what military measures on the part of Germany would be adequate compensation to the Allies for acceding to their demand. Whatever questions were put to Versailles, the British War Office must refer the matter to its own military representatives.
M. Tittoni said that the situation would be that each country would refer the matter to whatever agents or bodies it thought capable of making a suitable examination.
Mr. Polk agreed with Mr. Balfour and M. Tittoni.
(It was decided:—
- (1)
- That no immediate reply to the German Government’s request should be given.
- (2)
- That the Military Representatives at Versailles, in collaboration with Marshal Foch, should investigate the accurancy of the statements contained in the communication of the German Government, and should utilise all available sources of information at their command.
- (3)
- That Marshal Foch should report to the Council on such military compensations as might be demanded from Germany in return for a compliance with their present request.)
2. M. Clemenceau circulated two telegrams from Germany (see Appendices B & C) stating (1) that Germany had at present 800,000 men under arms, and (2) that the students in Munich were being armed in violation of the Peace Treaty. Information From Germany With Regard to the Number of Men Under Arms in That Country and the Arming of Students of Munich
Mr. Balfour stated, that before proceeding further with the question, he would like to have comprehensive figures comparing the total number of enemy and Allied troops at present in the field. He feared that such figures might be alarming.
M. Tittoni said that as Marshal Foch was going to study the questions put to him under decision No. 1, he would like him to state what force was now required in Germany for the maintenance of order.
Marshal Foch replied that the question was answered by the military provisions of the Armistice and of the Peace Treaty. He considered that the significance of the events at Munich lay in the fact, that the Germans wished to show, by what they were doing, that they knew that Allied control over their actions would soon cease.
M. Clemenceau remarked that the communication circulated drew attention to the point.
(It was therefore decided that the two documents circulated should be submitted to Marshal Foch for examination and report.)
3. M. Clemenceau read a telegram from General Franchet d’Esperey with regard to the Allied occupation of Thrace (see Appendix D). Communication From General Franchet d’Esperey, Commander in-Chief of the Allied Armies in the East
He remarked that it was obviously necessary to rein force the Allied troops in Bulgaria although the measure presented practical difficulties.
Mr. Balfour said that as he understood it the situation was serious and a comparison between the available Allied and Bulgarian forces would be disadvantageous to ourselves. He had received a report that the disarmament of Bulgaria was incomplete, on account of the different way in which demobilisation was carried out in such countries as England and France, and in Bulgaria. In the former case, demobilisation meant that soldiers returned absolutely to their civil occupations, and ceased to appear on the list of any military unit. This was not the case in Bulgaria, where demobilisation meant no more than the reduction of a military unit, from war to peace strength. The Bulgarian Army had comprised ten divisions. Under the Armistice it had been allowed to keep three and had been ordered to demobilise seven. This meant no more than that, Bulgaria now had a powerful military force of three divisions on full war strength, and seven others on a reduced footing.
Marshal Foch said that he thought Mr. Balfour’s remarks as a [Page 453] whole were correct, but he could not guarantee the accuracy of the details.
M. Clemenceau said that General Franchet d’Esperey had been asked to give a detailed report, but that no very clear statement had yet been received from him.
Marshal Foch said that the Bulgarian Army had never even obeyed orders it had received from the Allies. It was quite possible that they would have a superior force to that of the Allies, at the time that the Peace Treaty was presented.
M. Clemenceau said that he proposed that Marshal Foch should report on the situation, and asked the approximate time necessary for the preparation of such a report.
Marshal Foch said it would require several days, as he would be obliged to refer the matter to General Franchet d’Esperey.
General Weygand stated that a certain amount of information was already at hand and that a report on the basis of the information available could be presented to the Supreme Council on the following day.
(It was agreed that Marshal Foch should submit on August 2nd a report oil the present status of the Bulgarian forces, based upon information at present in his possession.)
(It was further decided that Marshal Foch should make investigations through General Franchet d’Esperey, and submit a full report when these latter had been received.)
4. M. Clemenceau circulated a telegram from the Military Representatives at Klagenfurt (see Appendix E).
Telegram From the Inter-Allied Military Representatives at Klagenfurt Relative to the Execution of the Decision of the Conference M. Berthelot further explained the telegram stating that by the withdrawal of the Austrians and Jugo-Slavs from Klagenfurt a certain quantity of war material had been left behind, under the custody of a few Italian carabinièri. In view of the fact that the Supreme Council had asked that an Inter-Allied guard should be placed in charge of the material in question, it was now requested that it should be constituted, and, until it could be so constituted, two companies of Italian carabinièri should be authorized by the Council to form the guard. He pointed out that the value of the property in question was inconsiderable, and suggested that two platoons of Italian carabiniéri would be quite efficient to ensure the custody of the material.
(It was agreed that the Italian Command should be authorised to furnish two platoons of carabinièri, for the purpose of guarding the war material at Klagenfurt.)
[Page 454]5. The Council had before it a communication from Marshal Foch to the following effect:—
“When the Army of Occupation shall have been organised, the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies on the Western front, who was in command during the war, will no longer exercise this command. Organisation of the High Command of the Army of Occupation in Western Germany After the Treaty Comes Into Force
However, it is necessary to maintain a superior After Germany Command for the group of Allied forces of occupation, were it only to establish a liaison with the High Commission who should communicate directly with the High Military Command (Art. IV of Memorandum of June 9th4), also for regulating all military questions dealing with railway, river, telegraphic, telephonic and postal communications.
France, on account of the number of troops in her army of occupation, should place a General at the head of the Rhine Army. The other Nations will probably not do this.
It is proposed that this General be designated to command the group of Allied occupation forces, as soon as the command of Marshal Foch on the Western front shall have ceased, in other words, at the moment that the Peace Treaty goes into force.”
(The proposals which Marshal Foch’s communication contained were agreed to without discussion.)
6. (a) Frontier of Prekomurye.
Report of the Commission on Roumanian and Jugo-Slav Affairs Regarding Further Claims by Yung-Slavia M. Tardieu stated that the Roumanian and Jugo-Slav Committee had submitted on July 22nd a Memorandum with regard to two new claims which had been presented by the Delegation of the Yugo-Slav kingdom regarding the northern frontier of that State, (see Appendix F).
(It was decided to adhere to the boundary line in Prekomurye formerly adopted by the Supreme Council which line in general follows the watershed between the Mur and the Raab.)
(b) Baranya
M. Tardieu read the Memorandum regarding Baranya, (see Appendix F).
(It was decided to accept the proposal of the Committee with regard to Baranya, and the frontier which had been proposed by it.)
7. (a) Bacska.
Serb-Croat-Slovene Claims M. Tardieu reported on the notes submitted to the Supreme Council by the Committee on Roumanian and Jugo-Slav Affairs dated 25th July, 1919 (see Appendix G).
(It was decided to accept the draft proposals of the Committee on Roumanian and Jugo-Slav Affairs with regard to the Bacska region; [Page 455] and to uphold the frontier line previously laid down, in view of the fact that the ethnographic conditions in the locality would not allow of the aforesaid frontier line being extended to the north. It was further decided to refer the question of laying down regulations of an international kind, with regard to the working of the Deak Canal, at present in Jugo-Slavia, by means of hydraulic installations now in Hungarian territory, to the Committee on Ports, Railways and Waterways.)
(b) Banat.
M. Tardieu drew the attention of the Conference to the Report of the Committee on Roumanian and Jugo-Slav Affairs on the subject of the Banat.
(It was decided to adopt the proposals contained in the report of the Committee on Roumanian and Jugo-Slav Affairs with regard to the Banat, as follows:—
- (1)
- Central Banat: The previously adopted frontier is to be upheld, and a notification to that effect sent to persons concerned. The Committee on Ports, Railways and Waterways will take the necessary measures to maintain and to develop, the irrigation canals in the Banat, to the equal advantage of the States to which the Banat is allotted.
- (2)
- Northern Banat: The question is to be adjourned for further study.
8. M. Tardieu said that the Committee on Roumanian and Jugo-Slav Affairs had received a note dated July 10th from the Jugo-Slav Delegation, asking that their troops be allowed to occupy the territories granted to Serbia by the Conference, in the region in question. The Committee had submitted a reply dated 26th July (see Appendix H). Since the Council had settled the territorial question in Prekomurye, he proposed that the suggested military occupation should be granted. Occupation of Perkomurye by Jugo-Slav Troops
(It was decided that the Jugo-Slav State should be authorised to occupy the territory in Prekomurye bounded by the frontier laid down and notified (see para. 6 subsection (a).)
9. M. Tardieu stated that the Committee on Roumanian and Jugo-Slav Affairs had given him a report dated 30th July, to which he had nothing to add. (See Annex 1 [to Appendix I].)Roumanian Frontiers in Bukovina
Mr. Balfour said that the Commission, after its first examination of the question, had decided, that, for ethnographical reasons, the small territorial area under discussion could not be given to the Bukovina. The reasons in question still held good, because the population of the district was more Ruthene than Roumanian in character. In addition to this, Poland had received Eastern Galicia, and laid no claims to the area now being considered. [Page 456] The desires of the population affected were the real matter for study. He asked what was the reason given by the Committee in support of these proposals. The answer probably was, that it would be advantageous, from a political point of view, to maintain the historical frontiers of Bukovina since that would be a measure which would please the Roumanian Government, and Roumanian public opinion. The Bukovina had never belonged properly to Roumania, and he was not in favour of granting it to that country, until such time as its real attitude towards the Allies had been cleared up. Up to the present time, the wishes and instructions of the Conference had been grossly disregarded by Roumania. That country had never acceded to our demands, and now that a territorial change, violating the principles of nationalities, was proposed in the interests of Roumanian public opinion, he preferred to adjourn the question.
Mr. Polk said that he had been told in the morning that the line shown in red on the chart, ran along the bottom of a Valley; and that he did not care for such a solution.
M. Tittoni said that he would like to draw attention to the following point, which was, that the frontier now proposed had been promised to Roumania when she entered the war. For this reason he would uphold it willingly. On the other hand, he recognised the strength of Mr. Balfour’s argument, and thought that Roumania should be informed, that it would only receive the territory in question, if it were willing to carry out the wishes of the Allies, and to sign the Treaty. Roumania was now in a state of discontent. The demands of that country in the Banat had been curtailed; and it would be unwise, therefore, to displease it with regard to Bukovina, unless there were important reasons for so doing. That is to say, the proposals of the Committee might be accepted under certain conditions.
M. Tardieu said that the Bessarabian question had not been settled either. Since the Council could exert pressure, it could be announced that the report of the Committee would be accepted if Roumania satisfied the Council in other ways.
Mr. Balfour said that there were also numerous negotiations proceeding between Roumania and Hungary, of a kind that did not arise out of the Treaty. It was nevertheless important that these negotiations should be concluded in a manner satisfactory to all. Roumania was not only concerned in signing the Treaty, it was also called upon to manifest its general goodwill.
Mr. Polk said that he accepted the proposal in principle; but that he would prefer that the question should again be referred to experts, since a frontier running through the bottom of a Valley seemed to him unsatisfactory.
M. Tardieu said that the question had been carefully examined by the Committee. The difficulty was that a part of the Bukovina had [Page 457] already been given to Roumania, and had been occupied by that country. The alternative would be to give it to Poland, who did not demand it.
Mr. Polk said that he raised no objection and that he was only insisting on a point of detail.
(It was decided to accept the Report of the Committee on Roumanian and Jugo-Slav Affairs, and to grant Bukovina to Roumania, with the exception of the area traversed by the railway line—Zaleszczyki-Kolomea—(see Annex 1 to Appendix I); on the condition that Roumania should show goodwill towards the Allies, with regard to the signature of the Treaty, and to the other questions in which she was concerned.)
10. M. Tardieu said he wished to draw attention to a question not on the order of the day, but one demanding an early solution; the problem was that of Bessarabia, on which the Council had taken no decision. Bessarabian Question
M. Maklakoff and M. Bratiano had expressed the Russian and Roumanian points of view. After they had been heard, the Council had discussed the matter briefly without coming to a decision.5 It remained to be known what solution the Council would adopt, for it was difficult to settle the Roumanian question as a whole, and to make that country accept clauses in the Peace Treaty on the subject of minorities, if, at the same time, its frontiers had not been notified to it.
M. Pichon said that the question was particularly important, in that the minorities question would arise in Bessarabia.
M. Tardieu said that the Committee had been unanimous in their wish to grant Bessarabia to Roumania, but the Council had sent a telegram to Admiral Koltchak,6 which appeared inconsistent with that decision. In the telegram in question the council had only stated that the Roumanian rights in Bessarabia should be preserved in favour of that country.
M. Clemenceau said that it was evidently important to be able to inform Roumania what its frontiers exactly were.
Mr. Balfour asked whether M. Tardieu thought that the Committee would remain of the same opinion if the question were referred back to it for a further report.
M. Tardieu said that the Committee had been unanimous when it had studied the problem. But they knew that certain Delegations had altered their opinions after the lapse of a few months. The difficult point was the telegram sent to Admiral Koltchak.
M. Pichon said that he did not think that the Council had been inconsistent, since it had not stated to Admiral Koltchak that Bessarabia as a whole would be granted to Roumania.
[Page 458]Mr. Balfour asked whether M. Pichon thought the telegram to Admiral Koltchak was not binding on the Council.
M. Pichon said that Admiral Koltchak’s attention had only been drawn to the fact that the Council upheld Roumanian rights in Bessarabia.
M. Tittoni said that he wished to draw the attention of the Council to an important point, which was, that the Committee had justified its proposals by saying that it wished to maintain the administrative and geographical unity of Bessarabia, and that it would give to Roumania, in compensation, a strip of territory in the Dobrudja, which belonged properly to the Bulgarians. By such a measure Roumania would be compensated for the Northern portion of Bessarabia left to Russia.
Mr. Balfour said he did not think he could admit compensations, which consisted in balancing the cession of groups of human beings, by the cession of others to foreign sovereignties, as a matter of principle.
M. Tittoni remarked that the question had therefore still to be examined.
M. Clemenceau said that the problem ought to be solved rapidly, and he proposed to put it on the Agenda for the following day.
Mr. Balfour said that he ought to call attention to the fact that Roumania was actually protesting strongly against the minority clauses. It would therefore be sufficient to tell that country, that it would not receive the territory now being considered, unless it accepted the minority clauses and signed the Treaty. In addition to this, Roumanian Statesmen did not really deny that the Southern part of the Dobrudja should be granted to Bulgaria. Had Roumania been our enemy during the war she would have been obliged to cede the territory. By the fact that she had been our Ally, she could only be persuaded to accept our solution. Was it therefore possible to say to that country, that it was going to receive a great extension of territory, but only under the condition that it would be willing to consent to the cession of the Dobrudja, which had been seized in 1913, and which, if left in her hands, would be a ceaseless cause of friction. The Roumanians were difficult people to deal with, and M. Bratiano was no exception.
M. Tittoni said that he had heard that a new ministry had been set up in Roumania, and that the President of the High Court had been instructed to form it.
Mr. Balfour said that he had also heard that, but the Cabinet had not been formed, and the Bessarabian question was so important that he hoped that each one of his colleagues would give it his consideration.
Mr. Polk said that the policy of the United States had been to oppose the division of Russia. Admiral Koltchak in his reply, had [Page 459] protested against his country being divided. He thought that the effect of dividing Russia would have a bad effect in that country, and was therefore of the opinion that it would be better not to settle the question straight away, but to await the return of ordered government in Russia.
M. Tittoni remarked that Russia’s point of view had been presented to the Council.
Mr. Polk said that the Roumanians opposed any idea of a plebiscite in Bessarabia.
M. Tittoni said that that was so, because the result of a plebiscite would be the establishment of Bolshevism.
Mr. Balfour said he did not desire to settle the question on that day, but that he would be willing that it should be taken up again in a few days’ time, if it were possible to settle it then. He did not, however, believe that it would be. In his opinion, he thought it better not to consider Russia, and to regard our hands as free. He was willing to wait for the formation of the new Roumanian Cabinet in the hope that it would be possible to negotiate with it and to settle outstanding problems.
M. Tardieu said that it would undoubtedly be better to wait for the formation of the new Government, but even if it were favourable to our point of view, we should have to inform it of our opinions on the Bukovina, Bessarabian and Dobrudja problems. It was not possible to do this at present.
Mr. Balfour said that if the new Roumanian Government proved satisfactory, it would send a representative to the Conference with whom the Council could negotiate. It would then be possible to tell this new representative that the Council was favourably disposed towards territorial concessions advantageous to Roumania, on the condition that the Roumanians themselves should give evidence of goodwill in the discussion of problems not yet solved.
M. Clemenceau said that it should be remembered that the Bulgarian Delegation was now actually waiting for the Conditions of Peace at Neuilly.
Mr. Balfour said that the Peace Treaty with the Bulgarians could be discussed and settled whilst the present question remained open.
(It was decided to postpone the discussion on Bukovina, Bessarabia and the Dobrudja until the formation of the new Roumanian Government.
It was further decided that the above questions should be put on the Agenda as soon as the new Government had been formed.)
M. Sergent and M. Cheysson7 entered the room.
[Page 460]11. M. Clemenceau left the room and M. Pichon took the Chair.
Reparation and Financial Clauses in the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria M. Pichon said that the Council had to examine the amendments brought forward by the Reparations and Finance Committee after hearing the Roumanian, Czecho-Slovak [Greek?] and Jugo-Slav Delegations.
M. Sergent read the report prepared by the two Committees. (See Appendix J.) He added that the Reparations Commission had been presented with a note from the Serbian Delegation. The note in question had been examined and its suggestions adopted partially. On the day in question, however, at two o’clock, a new note, couched in the most violent terms had been received, stating that Jugo-Slavia refused point-blank to accept article 4 in the Reparation Clauses. In the Peace Treaty with Germany the article in question had laid down that Bulgaria should transfer her debt with Germany to the Allies. In article 4 of the Reparation Clauses with Bulgaria that country was called upon to recognise the validity of the transfer of all credits due to the Governments of Germany, of Austria-Hungary and of Turkey, to the Allied and Associated Governments conformably with article 261 of the Peace Treaty with Germany; and to the corresponding articles in the Peace Treaties with Austria-Hungary and Turkey. At the same time, the Allied and Associated Governments had taken these debts into account, when they had considered the sums payable by Bulgaria, and had undertaken not to put forward any further claims under this head. Serbia stated in her note, that, whilst the Allied and Associated Governments might be in a position to forego later claims, they had no right to impose a corresponding renunciation upon Serbia. The note ended in what amounted to a threat to refuse to sign the Peace Treaty. The Reparation Committee had fixed the indemnity payable by Bulgaria at 2 billion francs. 250 million francs due from Bulgaria to Germany had been added to this sum. Since the Committee had taken the debt into account it thought that nothing further could be done.
Mr. Balfour said that the principle guiding the Council and the Reparations Committee had been that Bulgaria should pay the maximum amount that her resources allowed. It was of little importance, from the Bulgarian point of view that the sum should be paid to any particular Ally, since Serbia would have her share.
M. Sergent said that the Reparations Committee had first intended to divide the indemnity into two heads. Under the first head, would have been reparations amounting to 2 billion francs, and, under the second, 250 million francs owed by Bulgaria to Germany. This would have avoided giving the impression of renouncing the debt due to the Allies by Germany. It seemed that Serbia had not taken this simple calculation into account.
[Page 461]M. Pichon said that the Reparations Committee, being now informed of the issue, could submit a report, which should be waited for.
Mr. Polk said that Serbia was dissatisfied on another point, which was the amount of livestock to be delivered to her by Bulgaria. Was it possible to know what extra amount, under this head, had been granted to the Serbians?
M. Sergent said that the original figures had been doubled except in the case of the oxen. Serbia was actually going to receive 6,000 milch cows 5,000 horses and mares, 1,000 mules, 4,000 yoke oxen and 12,000 sheep. Notwithstanding this, the Serbian demand amounted to ten times that figure.
M. Berthelot said that in spite of the figures having been doubled, Serbia was only going to receive one tenth part of that which had been taken from her by the Bulgarians.
(It was decided to accept the Reparation Clauses, with the exception of article 4, dealing with the transfer of credits, and of article 6, dealing with the delivery of live-stock.)
M. Sergent and M. Cheysson then left the room and Generals Duval, Groves and [Rear Admiral] Orsini entered.8
12. General Duval said that he had to submit a report, dated 30th July, on the subject of the distribution of aeronautic material delivered by the enemy Governments (see Appendix K). Distribution of Aeronautic Material
Mr. Balfour said that the Note brought forward two questions:—
- (1)
- What principle was to govern the distribution of war material— a difficult question which had already raised considerable controversy.
- (2)
- How was this material to be dealt with when distributed between the Allied and Associated Powers.
The Committee proposed that the material in question should become the property of whatever Government it was given to, so long as this latter should undertake not to alienate it. He proposed to adjourn the first question and to accept the second principle enunciated.
M. Tittoni said that he accepted Mr. Balfour’s proposal, but asked that the first question should be referred to Versailles, in order that the settlement should be made conformable to the general principles guiding the general distribution of war material, in general.
(This proposal was adopted.)
(It was therefore decided:—
To request the Military Representatives at Versailles to submit a proposal regarding the principles to govern the distribution of all [Page 462] aeronautical war material turned over by the Central Powers in accordance with the Peace Treaty.
It was further decided that the Inter-Allied Commission of Control should be charged with the details of the distribution to be made in accordance with the principles established above. It was further decided that once this material had been allotted to and accepted by any one of the Allied and Associated Powers, it should become the property of such Government, which latter should agree not to alienate the material in question by any form of transfer.)
13. M. Tittoni presented the President with a report from the Italian Delegation on the subject of the delivery of arms and munitions to Czecho-Slovakia by Austria. (See H.D. 13, paragraph 11.)8a The report is contained in Annex “L”. The Delivery Arms and Munitions to Czecho-Slovakia
Villa Majestic, Paris, August 1, 1919.
[Page 463] [Page 476] [Page 478]- General P. Nudant, French representative and president of the Inter-Allied Armistice Commission.↩
- Matthias Erzberger, German Vice Chancellor and Minister of Finance.↩
- Fernand Larnaude, French representative, Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and Enforcement of Penalties.↩
- Appendix III to CF–64, vol. vi, p. 393.↩
- See FM–29, minute 1, p. 8.↩
- Appendix I to CF–37, vol. vi, p. 73.↩
- French representatives on the Financial Commission.↩
- Respectively French, American, and Italian representatives on the Aeronautical Commission.↩
- Ante, p. 263.↩
- Translation from the French supplied by the editors.↩
- Gen. Charles Joseph Dupont, head of the French Military Mission at Berlin.↩
- Abbreviation for Die Deutsche Waffenstillstandskommission (German Armistice Commission).↩
- Translation from the French supplied by the editors.↩
-
1 million Intelligence Service, Aix-la-Chapelle, May 22 (agent apparently reliable) Intelligence Service Aix-la-Chapelle, June 25 (officer attached to the Ministry of Marine) Intelligence Service, Aix-la-Chapelle, July 1, 1,500,000 men (Intelligence includes reserves) Declaration from Foerster (Berne, July 19—Intelligence Service, Strasbourg, May 21) Intelligence Service, Mayence, July 7 (reliable source) 800,000 Intelligence Service, July 26 (declarations by German officers) [Footnote in the original.]
↩ - Reichs-Gesetzlatt, 1919, No. 57, p. 295.↩
- Intelligence Service, Aix-la-Chapelle, June 27. [Footnote in the original.]↩
- Intelligence Service, Aix-la-Chapelle, July 22. [Footnote in the original.]↩
- Intelligence Service, Aix-la-Chapelle, July 16. [Footnote in the original.]↩
- Intelligence Service, Mayence, July 5. [Footnote in the original.]↩
- Intelligence Service, Strasbourg, July 22. [Footnote in the original.]↩
- See special study Intelligence Service fortnightly No. 2, Bureau No. 1, August. [Footnote in the original.]↩
- Circular of the Ministry of War, April. [Footnote in the original.]↩
- See note No. 2. Bureau, July 28. [Footnote in the original.]↩
- Instruction of July 14 (Intelligence Service, Strasbourg, July 23) [Footnote in the original.]↩
- Decree of July 2 (Intelligence Service, Strasbourg, July 26). The effective force of the gendarmery increased in 1919 from 240 officers, 9,395 men to 318 officers, 14,537 men. [Footnote in the original.]↩
- Intelligence Service, Aix-la-Chapelle, July 26. [Footnote in the original.]↩
- Note, Ministry of War, June 18. [Footnote in the original.]↩
- Gustav Noske, German Minister of Defense.↩
- “The military authorities systematically deceive the Entente regarding effectives” writes Professor Foerster. “Information supplied to various Allied Military Missions is intentionally erroneous.” [Footnote in the original.]↩
- “There are still military men who seem not to be aware of the conditions of the Peace Treaty”, declares the Freiheit after an inquiry at the recruiting offices, “and who think even less of fulfilling them.” [Footnote in the original.]↩
- Translation from the French supplied by the editors.↩
- Translation from the French supplied by the editors.↩
- See appendix IV to CF–71, vol. vi, p. 498.↩
- See CF–85, minute 3, vol. vi, p. 628.↩
- Translation from the French supplied by the editors.↩
- See Annex I. [Footnote in the original.]↩
- Translation from the French supplied by the editors.↩
- Foreign Relations, 1878, p. 895.↩
- Translation from the French supplied by the editors.↩
- Appendix F to HD–21, p. 468.↩
- Translation from the French supplied by the editors.↩
- Translation from the French supplied by the editors.↩
- HD–15, minute 6, p. 324.↩
- This document does not accompany the minutes.↩
- Appendix D to HD–15, p. 330.↩
- The translation is that given in S–H Bulletin No. 607, August 1, 1919 (Paris Peace Conf. 184.611/667).↩
- The translation is that given in S–H Bulletin 648 (Paris Peace Cont 185.2151/24).↩
- For previous reference to this proposal, see CF–53, vol. vi, p. 254.↩