Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, Volume II

File No. 860d.00/259

The Consul at Helsingfors (Haynes) to the Secretary of State

No. 24

Helsingfors, July 15, 1918.
[Received August 22.]

Sir: I have the honor to submit a report in duplicate on “Finland’s present political situation as affecting the Allies and the Central powers.”

This report is written in absolute loyalty and faithfulness to the policy pursued by our Government and is divulged only to the Department for the purpose of furnishing all possible information.

I have [etc.]

Thornwell Haynes

[Enclosure]

Finland’s Present Political Situation as Affecting the Allies and the Central Powers

The long-continued agitation in Finland’s Diet for a monarchy versus a republic was voted on last Saturday, July 13, 1918, with a failure of a two-thirds majority for the monarchy, the result being 52 votes for the republic and 57 for the monarchy. Another vote after the third reading is to be taken next Thursday, July 18, 1918.

Throughout the several days’ discussion, the advocates of a republic have insisted that the Diet’s decision of last December when the Whites were in power was a declaration of an independent republic which was so recognized by France, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Switzerland, and the Soviet government of Russia.

The monarchical agitators, consisting of the bourgeois Swedes, Finns, and pro-Germans, still declare that the adherence to last December’s decision is especially unwise, since the obstacles which then prevented a free choice no longer exist. “It is inexact,” say they, “that Finland was recognized as a republic and that the oath of the White Guard army was given to it as such, for the principle involved is not the form of government but that of its spirit—not that of a republic, but that of independence.”

The interior republican and monarchical dissension, which since the German occupation of Finland has threatened another civil war, is due to a firm belief on the part of the White Guard government that Germany will win the war, while the advocates of a republic are such from principle regardless of the world-war outcome, although their sentiments are for the most part decidedly pro-Entente.

A Geographically Divided Finland

It is not without the realms of supposition that the persistence of the monarchists, encouraged by the German military, may lead to a divided Finland, wherein the northern portion, composed of farmers and the purer, un-Swedish-tainted, or anti-Swedish, proletariat Finns, may naturally become a republic; and the southern portion, by the efforts of the White Guard “bourgeois and pro-German Swedes, organized as a monarchy. Such a result might relieve the country of its socialistic-versus-capitalistic grievances, and especially free it from the internal ethnological Swedish-Finnish-speaking antagonism which has been its tragedy since conquered by Sweden six hundred years ago—a tragedy intensified by Russia’s forcing a third language upon the population in 1809—for the Tower of Babel is not the only aim brought to an untimely end by too many languages.

And, too, such a division as this, while still giving Germany a friendly nation across the Baltic, would be detrimental in cutting her off from her designs on the White Sea and Arctic Ocean, and throw more sympathetically that 60 or 65 per cent of pro-Ally Finland toward the Entente, establishing friends next to the Murman and Karelia where the Entente’s interests for the present more nearly lie.

Pro-Entente Sympathy Greater than Supposed

Parenthetically, the statement that there are still 60 or 65 per cent of the population possessing pro-Entente sympathies might be seriously challenged were it not explained that the present political situation is such that only the pro-German element is in power and can express itself, while the opposing element has no means of making itself known. And such a situation will hardly be changed until the monarchists realize that Germany is doomed to lose the war.

The pathos with which the opinion and feelings of a great portion of this 60 or 65 per cent are suppressed is accentuated by the report that scores of the population, who believe their country has been betrayed by its own people into the hands of Germany, often visit the bluffs of the southern coasts and strain their eyes toward the horizon in anticipation of the coming of the English fleet to deliver them.

Changing Attitude toward Bolshevism

The Finns, who until a few weeks ago hated the Russian Bolsheviks, have been blinded by the Germans into loving them, or at least into that attitude wherein they would rejoice at the clash of arms between the Entente and the Soviet. This hoodwinking by Germany is of course due to a desire that Bolshevism may live and the shame of Brest Litovsk be perpetuated.

But the German manipulation of Finland’s political vision has not arrived at the point where the present de facto government would officially order her White Guard troops to arrange themselves alongside of Germany and the Bolsheviks in a war against the Allies. A proof of this is partially shown by the present hesitancy and postponement of Finland to conclude a treaty with the Soviet government in settlement of the Murman-Karelian question, for the Finnish government’s doubt as to the validity of such a treaty is strengthened by its realization of the insecurity of the Bolshevik government. Continued pressure by Germany, however, has arranged a conference for a treaty to meet July 20, 1918, at Revel.

Improbability of War

The British Consul and the French Consul in Helsingfors still express their belief that war between the Entente and Finland is only a matter of a very few days, and that in the event of the Finnish de facto government’s refusing officially to declare their White Guard army allied with Germany for the purpose of driving the Entente forces out of the Murman, the Allies will declare war on Finland if Germany is allowed to use the country as a base to attack the Entente troops.

Three reasons appear to oppose this belief:

1. Finland having seemingly been compelled to seek Germany’s aid against the Red terror, is now unable to rid herself of German occupation, even if she earnestly desired it. What advantage then could arrive to the Allies in declaring such a war and thus controvert the humane and sympathetic attitude hitherto shown the unwilling but treacherously compelled betrayal of Rumania, as well as the patience shown Russia?

2. The military representatives of the Entente in the Murman have issued a proclamation declaring that the Allies have occupied the Murman coast in order to protect their property and to assure the continued possession of these regions to Russia who is at present too feeble to protect them, and that their presence there means no designs against Finland.

3. It has been stated in the Helsingfors press that there is no intention on the part of the Entente to disregard Finnish pretensions on the Murman, and that it would not be impossible to obtain a realization of these pretensions provided Finland preserves her neutrality and does not become an instrument in the hands of Germany.

Danger and Unreasonableness of a Finnish-Murman Port

It can not be overlooked, however, that many of Finland’s public officials, especially those now composing the Senate, are simply German agents, and that Allied deference to Finland to the extent of preserving peace by granting her any right to a port on the Murman coast would be a very dearly bought peace, as such would mean nothing less than another German submarine base. Conclusions drawn from present conditions indicate the absurdity of Finland’s claiming a Murman coast port. She is so fast jeopardizing her political and commercial relations with the Allies as to make such a northern port useless and unreasonable, whereas toward her greatest friend Germany, with whom she probably vainly expects future commercial possibilities, all her splendid southern ports lie open and free.

Reasons for Neutrality

Finland’s internal conditions offer every argument against her entering the war:

1. The recent Red terror, with all its civil-war bloodshed, is sufficient to satiate, at least for the present, any further desire for war.

2. The 75,000 idle and starving Red prisoners, composed entirely of the working classes, have decreased agricultural production and damaged economic and industrial resources so as greatly to accentuate the fear of famine. It is this deficiency of labor which has prompted the Diet’s serious consideration of lengthening the recently passed eight-hour labor law, or at least to make exceptions for those of 18 years and over who are especially strong.

3. In addition to these 75,000 idle prisoners, a war would mean a loss to the farms also of the White Guard labor now employed, and at the present crisis of lack of food it would be near suicidal to turn independent creators of foodstuffs into an army of dependent consumers. It is difficult to believe that Finnish officials, even though real German agents, can be quite active enough and Finland’s gratitude to Germany quite strong enough to lead the country thus far.

4. Moreover, Finland’s pro-German advocates of the monarchy must still be sensible enough to realize that agitation for war across the frontiers for the purpose, as urged, of relieving the distress of their brothers in Karelia, who can scarcely be in a worse condition than Finland herself, is an adventure undertaken really in the interest of Germany, and as such would simply increase the anti-German or pro-Entente feelings of those who are in favor of a republic.

5. Some 90 to 95 per cent of the wealthy classes have made their fortunes in trade with Russia, England, America, France, Spain, and Italy. The remuneratively exchangeable commodities between Finland and Germany are infinitesimal compared with those of the Entente powers, and this 90 to 95 per cent are already beginning to wonder what the future has in store for their bank accounts.

America’s Misunderstanding of Finland

The source from which America has gained much misconception concerning Finland is meager and not altogether reliable:

1. America has judged Finland by the immigrant class which up to 1914 has been entering the United States at an average yearly rate of 16,000, a class representing the lowest and most ignorant of the country’s population.

2. This mistaken judgment has been emphasized by Finland’s political affiliation with Russia and the evil genius of the present war which has mercilessly fallen upon her unfortunate geographical position and national aspirations.

3. A small per cent of Americans have had their opinions formed by occasional newspaper articles written by unintentionally irresponsible correspondents who as “passers-through” have naturally gathered the superficial instead of facts.

4. Since the war most articles appearing in the American press have been written by long-distance observers from such places as Moscow, Petrograd, Stockholm, Copenhagen, and even London and Paris, and compiled indiscriminately from unreliable anti-Finnish press news, verbal hearsay, and the writer’s imagination.

5. Probably the source of our Government’s official information has been our Ambassador in Petrograd and our Minister in Stockholm, both of whose time and judgment have for many months been taxed to cope with the political kaleidoscopic changes in their own immediate vicinity.

6. Up to November 1, 1917, the only American representative the American Government had in Finland was a Finnish pro-German who had held the post as consular agent for fourteen years. At present the only representative we have in Finland is a consul at Helsingfors. In contrast to this Great Britain has 12 consular representatives; Germany, in 1913, had 14; France has 7; Spain, 14; Italy, 2; Austria-Hungary, one; Sweden, 19; Belgium, 5; Denmark, 17; Netherlands, 10; Portugal, 10; Norway, 14; and Rumania, Greece, Argentina, Mexico, Brazil, and Uruguay, each, one.

At present Sweden, Germany, Norway, Denmark, Spain, and Russia have diplomatic representatives in Helsingfors. There are a few other nations who have such representatives here, but the changes are so rapid it is difficult to give exact data.

An Estimate of the Population

As far as a residential nine months’ study of the Finns permits one to form an opinion of their character, the following estimate is briefly ventured:

1. Of all Russia’s provinces, Finland is perhaps the most refined and educated.

2. It has been asserted even, by those in a position to know conditions, that Finland’s misfortune is overeducation.

3. Her art and literature possess a worthy past and promise much for the future.

4. There are homes in Finland as refined and cultured as the best in America and Europe.

5. The worst critics of Finland assert the most unfortunate characteristics of the people are cruelty, stubbornness, treachery, and ungratefulness. Such characteristics, however, apply less to the Swedish-speaking population.

Have We Given Finland Her Share of Attention?

It appears that no neutral economic battle ground, Belgium not excepted, has for the past twelve months offered America more promising possibilities for diplomatic friendship and victory than Finland. Is it true that our embargo act has ruthlessly fallen upon all neutrals alike without any distinction as to national psychological demands, geographical situation, past history, or political tendencies? Is it true that Finland is in the hands of Germany to-day because the Allies refused her food?

The answer to these questions may be in the negative, for Finland is not blameless. She has not the political foresight of an independent nation which has the experience and wisdom of years of self-guidance. Even the act of refusing food to these people may have been wise and good and for the best, because the western front is of vastly more importance than Finland’s paltry three and a half million inhabitants. And yet “three and a half million people” does not express all that Finland means. There is the back-door, post-war trade with Russia which Finland means; there are the geographical opportunities and military possibilities of Germany reaching across her to the White Sea and the Baltic; and there are all the future, far-reaching, intricate, world-destiny problems of the tragic East, which might more easily be solved in favor of America and the Entente with Finland as a friend.

P. S. The foregoing is written in all loyalty to the course pursued by our Government, and is divulged only to the Department of State for any side lights which it may afford.

Thornwell Haynes