File No. 861.00/1868
The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 25, 4.29 p.m.]
1657. De Giers, Russian Ambassador at Rome, has handed me copies of two memoranda on the prospects of aiding Russia, given by him to Baron Sonnino, who in an informal conversation with me, expressed himself, without entering into details, as strongly of the opinion that something of this kind should be done, and immediately, to save the situation. Same seems to be the view of French Ambassador. All agree that whatever is done should be done quickly and in complete unison. Sonnino further thinks that the Bolshevik so-called government should be disavowed. He says that it is playing into the hands of the Germans and is merely a blind.
There seems to be a growing feeling here that steps must be taken without delay to save Russia’s falling completely and permanently into the hands of the Germans. The proposal from political standpoint seems excellent, but impracticable. I do not recommend military point of view.
The first memorandum states that the most vital interests of the Entente clearly indicate two aims which should be pursued in their political policies in regard to Russia: (1) During the war to help to establish without delay in Russia resistance to the German invasion, and to draw to eastern front largest possible Austro-Hungarian force; (2) after the war to safeguard the political and economic liberty of Russia, as the German domination of Russia would constitute great danger to entire world, and particularly to Allies whose material interests already amount to billions.
[Page 171]Help should not be given, however, to the Maximalists and other anarchical parties. The heads of the parties that protested through the French Consulate Moscow could facilitate formation of such a government. Allied troops would be needed as a nucleus for recruiting a national army. Real and solid assistance would be afforded by from 80,000 to 100,000 men to he sent to some Russian port, not as an army of [occupation], nor with police functions which might arouse opposition, but for the expressed purpose of supporting the proposed new government in the reestablishment of law, and would, it is declared, be well received as evinced by the growing hostility toward German occupation as well as this movement. The work of organization would take about eight months, at the end which time Russia would again be at open war with Germany.
The second memorandum proposes in some detail the formation of the expeditionary force, even a small one of from 30,000 to 40,000, composing the mobile units which would suffice at first for the Russians to get in touch with, but which would not, like a large force stationed at some place, form a point for attack by the Germans. Small detachments of from 500 to 1,000 men could be sent to different parts of the country to help reorganize Russian Army, and prove to the people that they had not been abandoned by the Allies. Mention is also made along general lines concerning establishments of Allied troops, materials needed, railroad transportation in Russia, value of armored motor cars, cyclists, etc., which it is declared would be needed and would be most effective.