File No. 861.00/1726½
[A copy of the following paraphrase of a telegram was handed to the
Secretary by the Ambassador on May 1, 1918:]
The British Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs (Balfour) to the Ambassador at
Washington
It is true that the formation of a correct estimate as to
Trotsky is one of
our principal difficulties. It has not yet been possible for me
to go into the documentary evidence against him which you
mentioned, but quite apart from such evidence his course of
action has so frequently been exactly that which the
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Germans would have
preferred that it is impossible to regard him as beyond
suspicion. All witnesses returning from Russia, on the other
hand, with whom I have discussed the matter, whether they like
or dislike him, appear to agree in thinking that for the moment
he holds an absolutely commanding position in Russia and in
these circumstances we are obliged either to defy him, to work
with him, or to do nothing. The first of these three
alternatives is dangerous, and the last fatal, and we are
therefore obliged to accept the second, whatever misgivings this
may cause us.
The policy of working with Trotsky is not free from dangers. The simple
fact that we are cooperating with him, even assuming that he
does not betray us, will have a tendency to place in opposition
large sections of Russian opinion who are at present absolutely
powerless but may perhaps obtain control of Russia in the
future, with or without help from Germany. As far as I am now
able to judge, our only means of lessening this risk is by
keeping ostentatiously apart from internal questions, and by
avoiding, if we can, any formal recognition of the present
government.
The actual number of troops sent by the United States to Siberia
is, in my opinion, a matter merely of secondary importance, and
the really vital problem with which we have to deal is to
prevent the Central powers obtaining supplies from Russia and,
through a renewal of the Allied menace in the east, to prevent
the continued removal of troops to the western front before it
has been possible for the enemy to consolidate his grip upon
Russian territory and Russian resources. I am very apprehensive
that we are now allowing critical moments to go by without
making full use of them.
We realize that there is a fear in the minds of many Americans
that a reaction in favour of an autocratic regime may be
produced by Allied intervention. It appears to me that, if the
present chaotic conditions continue, a reaction in this
direction cannot be avoided, and that when it occurs it will
take place under German inspiration and in the interest of
Germany. The only chance which we have is to provide for the
patriotic elements in Russia, whatever political opinions they
may hold, a solid Allied nucleus around which these elements may
be able to organize themselves against the common enemy and
against the system of autocracy, the establishment of which is
part of the enemy’s scheme. It is important to bear in mind that
Russia, if she passes completely under the domination of Germany
and is reduced to a condition of starvation, would furnish the
enemy with an unlimited supply of man power which could be used
either for war or for the purposes of industry. If the war
continues for a long time, this possibility may prove to be one
of the most serious dangers which we have to face.
